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1INTRODUCTION
“Reasoning is central to the
understanding of justice even in a
world which contains much
‘unreason’; indeed, it may be
particularly important in such a
world.”
Amartya Sen
Theories of distributive justice concern the normative evaluation of a soci-
ety’s distribution of income, wealth or other valuable goods among its members.
Since A Theory of Justice by Rawls (1971), there has been a flourishing philo-
sophical literature on whether and under what circumstances the allocation of
goods in a society can be considered just.1
In the early twentieth century, prominent economists (such as Pigou, Dalton,
Hicks, Samuelson and Arrow) also focused on normative issues. However,
justice is often considered outside the scope of economics nowadays. As noted
by Atkinson (2001, p. 195), “Economists do not devote a great deal of time to
investigating the values on which their analyses are based” since the 1960s. Yet,
“It is a legitimate exercise of economic analysis to examine the consequences
of various value judgments” (Samuelson, 1947, p. 220), and there is actually
1See, among others, Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), Dworkin (1981a,b), Nozick (1974) and
Sen (1992, 2011).
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an important literature in economics that addresses normative issues, namely,
normative economics to which this dissertation seeks to contribute.
The next four chapters study principles of distributive justice in a variety of
economic environments. In each chapter, the main goal is to provide criteria
– rankings or social welfare functions – for the evaluation of distributions in
terms of fairness and efficiency.2 Although we draw upon ideas found in the
philosophical literature, the current study is primarily an economic inquiry in
which we employ an axiomatic approach.3 In each chapter, we first postulate
axioms representing the relevant principles of distributive justice. The evaluation
criteria are obtained as logical consequences of these axioms. Our primary
motivation in adopting an axiomatic approach is not the satisfaction we derive
from the procedure itself – though the author admits to the satisfaction part
– but the fact that such a procedure makes the ethical criteria underlying the
welfare statements clear. Hopefully, the results presented here contribute to our
knowledge of important principles of distributive justice, and provide tools for
their use.
Fairness is a popular but complicated concept. In defining what constitutes
a just distribution, one needs to first ask what the relevant outcome of interest
(income, well-being, etc.) is and who the recipients of that outcome (individuals,
countries, etc.) are. Then comes one of the most important questions, if not
the most important question, one must ask when defining distributive justice:
“Which individual characteristics are to be considered ethically relevant?” In
other words, one must ask which personal characteristics, if any, can justify
inequalities in the outcomes obtained by two recipients. Naturally, what is
ethically relevant depends on the specific problem at hand. For instance, the
number of hours worked might be considered relevant in an income distribution
problem, while it might not matter in the problem of seat allocation in a movie
theatre.
2We use “fair” and “just” interchangeably throughout this study.
3See Roemer (1998b) for an account of the interplay between contemporary political
philosophy and the economic literature on distributive justice.
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In Chapter 2, the outcome of interest is a set of m commodities, and the
recipients are individuals. The primary notion of fairness adopted is envy-
freeness. An allocation is said to be envy-free if no individual prefers someone
else’s bundle to his own. An inequality in a distribution of the m commodities
is considered inoffensive by envy-freeness provided that no individual prefers
what another individual has to his own. The criterion thus considers preferences
to be the ethically relevant characteristic.
Even though it is one of the most important concepts of the economic
literature on distributive justice, envy-freeness does not solve all distributional
problems. This is because the set of envy-free and efficient allocations can be
quite large, or it might be empty. In the first case, we still have the question of
which allocation to choose from the set of envy-free and efficient allocations. In
the second case, envy-freeness is completely silent. It is the second problem that
Chapter 2 deals with. We propose a method — a class of envy measures — to
compare allocations in terms of envy. The characterized class measures the envy
of one individual to another by the relative utility difference (using the utility
function of the envious) between the bundle of the envied and the bundle of the
envious. The particular utility representation to be used is fixed by the axioms.
The class measures overall envy by the sum of these (transformed) relative
utility differences. In the absence of an envy-free and efficient allocation, the
class of envy measures provides a way to compare allocations based on their
intensity of envy. For instance, allocations in the Pareto efficient subset that
minimize an envy measure constitute interesting options.
In Chapter 3, the outcome of interest is income, and the recipients are a group
of n individuals. The principle of distributive justice focused on in this chapter
is libertarianism. Libertarianism ascribes ethical significance to laissez-faire
outcomes. Redistributive taxation is considered an inherent injustice. We define
an axiom, laissez-faire, to capture the libertarian opposition to redistribution.
The axiom says that the no-redistribution case (i.e., the allocation in which each
individual is given his market income) is better than any other allocation of the
same amount of total income. Hence, libertarianism is a criterion of distributive
justice that considers market income the ethically significant characteristic. Not
3
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only are inequalities arising from differences in market incomes considered
inoffensive, but also promoted.
Two main lines of justification proposed for libertarianism are individual
liberty and efficiency of the free market. It is the second line of arguments
that this chapter belongs to. We show that we still encounter problems in
achieving efficiency even if redistribution is completely eliminated. Theorem
3.2 shows that it is impossible to combine the laissez-faire principle with Pareto
indifference. Weakening Pareto indifference to weak Pareto (which states that
an increase in the disposable income of everyone is an improvement) helps us
avoid the impossibility, but the possibilities are very limited. We find that a
ranking which satisfies weak Pareto and laissez-faire strictly prefers an income
allocation with higher total income regardless of the distribution of market
incomes. It is only when the sums are equal that the ranking respects market
incomes. Thus, the ranking leaves very little room for libertarian values.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 both assume that individuals differ only with respect
to one relevant personal characteristic: preferences in Chapter 2 and market
incomes in Chapter 3. What does distributive justice require if individuals differ
with respect to both relevant and irrelevant characteristics? It is this question
that Chapter 4 deals with.
In Chapter 4, the outcome of interest is income, and the recipients differ with
respect to ethically relevant characteristics (called responsibility characteristics)
and irrelevant characteristics (called circumstances). The main ideal of fairness
is equality of opportunity.
Equality of opportunity as a criterion of distributive justice consists of two
main principles. The first, the principle of compensation, deems inequalities
due to differences in circumstances unacceptable. The second, the principle
of reward, tackles the question of how to allocate income between individuals
who differ only with respect to their responsibility characteristics. We focus
on two interpretations of the reward idea. The first, liberal reward, says that
market income differences should be respected when distributing income among
individuals who share the same circumstances. The second, utilitarian reward,
4
says that fairness need not be concerned with the manner in which income is
distributed among such individuals.
In Chapter 4, we first present classes of social welfare functions that satisfy
compensation and liberal reward, and compensation and utilitarian reward. We
also present the optimal distributions suggested by these social welfare functions.
In the second part of the chapter, following the procedure proposed by Atkinson
(1970) and Kolm (1969), we propose to measure inequality of opportunity in a
given income distribution by the per capita income that could be destroyed if
incomes are distributed fairly and the resulting income distribution has the same
welfare as the given distribution. We show that this is equivalent to measuring
inequality of opportunity in a distribution by the difference between the welfare
at the actual distribution and welfare at the fair distribution of the same total
income. Thus, the characterized welfare function classes serve as the ethical
basis for the inequality measures in the sense that the inequality of opportunity
registered increases as an income distribution moves further (in terms of welfare
difference) from the optimal distribution.
In Chapter 5, the outcome of interest is an international river, and the re-
cipients are sovereign countries located along the river. Sharing water from
international rivers has often been a source of conflict between riparian countries
mostly because property rights over rivers are not well defined. Several interna-
tional principles of international law were proposed to solve this problem. We
focus on three that attracted most attention from policymakers and researchers.
First, the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty (ATS), states that a country
has absolute sovereignty over the part of the river that is within its borders. Thus,
the principle considers borders ethically relevant. Second, unlimited territorial
integrity (UTI), states that one country cannot alter the quantity or quality of
water available to another. That is, the principle considers the amount of water
available up to a country’s border ethically relevant. Third, territorial integration
of all basin states (TIBS), considers the entire river a single unit and allows each
country an unlimited use of it. That is, the principle considers all countries the
same with respect to their relevant characteristics.
5
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Even though these principles are intuitive, they are difficult to formulate
in applications. Moreover, there is an ongoing debate on which one to use in
practical applications. It is these two questions that Chapter 5 tackles. First, we
propose a way to formalize the principles. To do so, we take a reference vector
r that defines the property rights over the river. That is, ri shows the amount of
river water i has a right to consume without having to compensate any other
country. Our main axiom, Pigou-Dalton for r, says that, given that each country
consumes its reference level of water, equalizing monetary compensations
received by countries is an improvement. We argue that the axiom provides a
reasonable way to formalize the aforementioned principles via the choice of the
reference vector. Theorem 5.1 shows that anonymity and Pigou-Dalton for r
imply that TIBS must be chosen over ATS and UTI (Theorem 5.1).
Taking territorial integration of all basin states as the primary criterion of
distributive justice, we show that a ranking that satisfies Pigou-Dalton for r,
Pareto, anonymity and an independence axiom applies the Lorenz dominance
criterion to equivalent income vectors. The equivalent income of a country is
the amount of the hypothetical monetary compensation that, if combined with
the reference level of water consumption, would give the country the same
utility as its initial situation. The Hammond equity version of Pigou-Dalton
for r combined with weak Pareto, on the other hand, characterizes the class of
egalitarian equivalent orderings that apply the maximin criterion to vectors of
equivalent income.
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2AN AXIOMATIC APPROACH TO THE MEASUREMENT
OF ENVY1
2.1 Introduction
An allocation is envy-free if no individual prefers another individual’s
commodity bundle to his own.2 Envy-freeness is a crude criterion of distributive
justice. It distinguishes only two classes of allocations, those that are envy-free
and those that are not.
There are good reasons to consider envy measures that provide more dis-
criminatory envy rankings of allocations. Envy-freeness generalizes the idea of
equality to the setting of ordinal non-comparable preferences.3 The study of
envy measures is therefore a natural extension of the theory of inequality mea-
surement. Further, allocations that are both envy-free and Pareto efficient are
not guaranteed to exist in non-transferable-commodities or production settings.4
1This chapter is based on collaborative work with Kristof Bosmans.
2The seminal references are Tinbergen (1946), Foley (1967), Kolm (1972) and Varian (1974).
See Arnsperger (1994) and Thomson (2010) for surveys.
3See Arnsperger (1994, pp.157-158) and Fleurbaey (2008, pp.22-24). For example, if there
is only one commodity, say income, then the equal income distribution is the unique envy-free
allocation. See Temkin (1986, 1993) and Cowell and Ebert (2004) for approaches to income
inequality measurement that explicitly refer to envy-freeness.
4See Tadenuma (2002) for a discussion of the clash between Pareto efficiency and envy-
freeness in a formal setting similar to ours.
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Hence, allocations in the Pareto efficient subset that minimize an envy measure
constitute interesting compromises.
We introduce a new class of envy measures. Throughout, we discuss the
connections with envy measures proposed by Feldman and Kirman (1974),
Chaudhuri (1986), Diamantaras and Thomson (1990) and Fleurbaey (2008).
Whereas these previous envy measures were proposed on the basis of their
direct appeal, we use an axiomatic approach in order to make intuitions explicit.
We develop our class in two steps.
First, we examine the consequences of imposing decomposability. This ax-
iom requires that, for each partitioning of the population in two subgroups, envy
in the total population can be written as the sum of the envy within subgroups
and the envy between subgroups. In combination with a standard normalization
axiom, decomposability implies that envy is measured by ∑i∑ j Ei j, where Ei j
represents the envy of individual i towards individual j and depends only on the
bundles of i and j and the preferences of i. The value of Ei j is zero if i does not
envy j, and positive otherwise.
Second, we formulate two axioms, betweenness and proportionality, that
deal with envy comparisons in the simple two-individual setting. Assume
that the two individuals are i and j, and that i envies j but not vice versa.
Betweenness demands that envy decreases if i’s bundle improves or if j’s
bundle worsens according to i’s preferences. Proportionality requires that, for
cases where the bundles of individuals i and j are proportional to each other,
envy is smaller if the radial distance between the bundles is smaller. We show
that betweenness and proportionality are incompatible. We weaken the latter
axiom to r-proportionality, which applies the idea of proportionality only if
the bundles of i and j are proportional to a predetermined reference bundle
r. Given anonymity, betweenness and r-proportionality imply that Ei j is an
increasing function of the ratio ui(x j)/ui(xi), where xi and x j are the bundles
of individuals i and j and ui is a utility representation of i’s preferences. The
utility representation ui is not arbitrary, but rather is determined by the axioms
and depends on the chosen reference bundle r.
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2.2 Preliminaries
The set of individuals is N , a finite subset of the set of positive integers.
There are m commodities. The set of commodity bundles is X = Rm++. Each
individual i inN has a preference relation Ri, a complete and transitive binary
relation on X . The strict preference and indifference relations corresponding to
Ri are denoted by Pi and Ii, respectively. Let R¯ be a preference relation such that
xR¯y for all bundles x and y in X . The preference relation R¯ is indifferent between
all bundles in X and will play the role of a dummy preference relation. LetR be
the union of {R¯} and the set of all continuous and strictly monotonic preference
relations. Each individual i inN has a preference relation in R. For a set of
individuals N ⊆N , we let xN = (xi)i∈N and RN = (Ri)i∈N . We refer to (xN ,RN)
as a social state. We do not distinguish between two social states that differ only
with respect to the order in which the individuals are listed (e.g., (xi,x j,Ri,R j)
and (x j,xi,R j,Ri) are treated as the same social state). The set S collects all
social states for all finite population sizes. That is, S =
⋃
N⊂N X |N|×R|N|.
Consider a social state s = (xN ,RN). Individual i is said to envy individual j
if x jPixi. The social state s is said to be envy-free if xiRix j for all individuals i
and j in N. We use an envy measure to rank all social states in S on the basis of
envy. An envy measure is a function E : S→ R that associates with each social
state s in S a level of envy E(s).
We define two basic axioms. More axioms will be introduced in the subse-
quent sections. Normalization requires the envy measure to attain the value of
zero in envy-free social states and positive values in other social states.
Normalization. For each social state (xN ,RN) in S, we have E(xN ,RN) ≥ 0
with equality holding if and only if xiRix j for all individuals i and j in N.
Anonymity demands that two social states with identical bundle-preference
pairs have the same level of envy. These two states may distribute these identical
preference-bundle pairs differently over the same population or over altogether
different populations (of the same size). For a bijection π : N →M, and a social
state (xN ,RN), we write π(xN) for (xπ(i))i∈N and π(RN) for (Rπ(i))i∈N .
9
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Anonymity. For each social state (xN ,RN) in S and each bijection π : N →M,
we have E(xN ,RN) = E(π(xN),π(RN)).
It will be useful to single out two social states induced by a social state
s = (xN ,RN) in S. First, let si denote the social state in which the prefer-
ence relation of each individual j ̸= i is replaced by R¯. That is, we set
si = (x1, . . . ,xn, R¯, . . . , R¯,Ri, R¯, . . . , R¯). Second, let si j denote the social state
for the two-individual population {i, j} ⊆ N in which the preference relation of
individual j is replaced by R¯. That is, si j = (xi,x j,Ri, R¯). In the social state si,
the only envy that occurs is that of individual i towards all other individuals in N.
Likewise, in the social state si j, the only envy that occurs is that of individual i
towards individual j. We may therefore interpret E(si) as the envy of individual
i in social state s and E(si j) as the envy of individual i towards individual j in
social state s. We will refer to E(si) as the individual envy of i and to E(si j) as
the elementary envy of i to j. Note that E(si) and E(si j) are well defined for
each envy measure E and each social state s in S.
To put the analysis of the subsequent sections into perspective, we consider
several envy measures that have been proposed in the literature. None of these
measures has received axiomatic foundations. Each measure has been motivated
instead by its immediate intuitive appeal. Table 2.1 presents the envy measures
proposed by Feldman and Kirman (1974), Chaudhuri (1986), Diamantaras and
Thomson (1990).5 The table also shows how the measures fare with respect to
the axioms defined in this section and subsequent sections.
All five measures rely on elementary envy as a basic building block. For
the first four measures in Table 2.1, overall envy E(s) equals the sum of all
elementary envies ∑i∈N∑ j∈N E(si j). For the final measure in the table, overall
5Our formulation of the Diamantaras-Thomson measure follows Arnsperger (1994, Defini-
tion 5.4).
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Table 2.1 Five envy measures
Measure E(s) N A D B P r-P
First Feldman-Kirman |{{i, j} ⊆ N : x jPixi}| ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
Second Feldman-Kirman∗ ∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
[ui(x j)−ui(xi)] ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓‡ ✓‡
Third Feldman-Kirman∗ ∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
max{ui(x j)−ui(xi),0} ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓‡ ✓‡
Chaudhuri† ∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
max
{ 1
λi j
−1,0
}
✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
Diamantaras-Thomson† max
i, j∈N
{ 1
λi j
−1
}
✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
Abbreviations: N(ormalization), A(nonymity), D(ecomposability), B(etweenness),
P(roportionality), r-P(roportionality).
∗The function ui : Rm+→ R is a utility representation of Ri.
†The real number λi j is such that xiIiλi jx j.
‡The axiom is satisfied only for specific utility representations.
envy E(s) equals the maximum elementary envy maxi, j∈N E(si j).6 Let us focus
now on how each of the measures defines elementary envy.
For the first Feldman-Kirman measure, which is a simple count of the
instances of envy, the elementary envy E(si j) equals 1 if individual i envies in-
dividual j and 0 if not. The measure clearly neglects the intensity of elementary
envy, contrary to the next four measures in the table.
The second and third Feldman-Kirman measures assume each individual
i has a utility representation ui with cardinal significance, and compute the
intensity of elementary envy using utility differences. The elementary envy
E(si j) equals ui(x j)−ui(xi) for the second Feldman-Kirman measure, and the
same truncated at zero for the third Feldman-Kirman measure. Hence, the for-
mer measure takes into account ‘negative’ elementary envies, i.e., the extent to
which individuals prefer their own bundles to those of others, whereas the latter
6Hence, the five measures in Table 2.1 depend only indirectly on the individual envies.
The individual envy of i to all other individuals in N equals E(si) = ∑ j∈N E(si j) for the first
four measures in the table and E(si) = max j∈N E(si j) for the final measure. In Section 2.5,
we discuss a measure by Fleurbaey (2008, Chapter 2) that gives a more substantial role to the
individual envies.
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measure does not.7 A shortcoming of these two measures is the dependence on
the arbitrary choice of a utility representation ui for each individual i.
The Chaudhuri and Diamantaras-Thomson measures do not rely on cardinal
utility information. Instead, these measures focus on the fraction λi j by which
the bundle of j has to be shrunk in order for i to stop envying j. For the
Diamantaras-Thomson measure, elementary envy E(si j) equals (1/λi j)− 1,
where λi j is such that xiIiλi jx j. For the Chaudhuri measure, elementary envy is
the same value truncated at zero. Again, the Diamantaras-Thomson measure
takes into account ‘negative’ elementary envies, whereas the Chaudhuri measure
does not. A shortcoming of these two measures is their arbitrary dependence
on the particular procedure of shrinking the bundle of the envied. An a priori
equally appealing procedure would be to focus on the factor by which the bundle
of the envious has to be blown up in order for him to stop envying, but this
procedure yields different results (see Section 2.4).
We proceed as follows. In Section 2.3 we characterize an envy measure
that equates overall envy to the sum of all elementary envies. The measure
takes the form of the first four measures in Table 2.1. But measures that
equate overall envy to the maximum elementary envy, as the Diamantaras-
Thomson measure, or to the minimum elementary envy may be obtained as
limiting cases (see Section 2.5). In Section 2.4 we consider axioms that only
impose properties on an envy measure for the two-individual case. Using these
axioms we characterize a measure of elementary envy that combines the utility
difference approach of the second and third Feldman-Kirman measures and the
radial distance approach of the Chaudhuri and Diamantaras-Thomson measures.
But at the same time it avoids the shortcomings of these approaches. Section
2.5 combines the results of the two preceding sections into a single class of envy
measures and discusses its properties.
7Feldman and Kirman (1974, p. 997) introduce their third measure with the explicit objective
of measuring envy without taking into account ‘negative’ elementary envies. It may indeed
be argued that such ‘negative’ elementary envies should be considered as irrelevant in equity
evaluations. Our axioms also neutralize their role (see Section 2.3).
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2.3 Envy as the sum of elementary envies
To define decomposability, imagine a partitioning of the population into two
subgroups, e.g., on the basis of region, ethnicity or gender. Decomposability
conveniently allows to write overall envy in the population as a sum of the envy
within subgroups and the envy between subgroups.8
Decomposability. For each social state (xN ,RN) in S and each partition {N1,N2}
of N with non-empty N1 and N2, we have
E(xN ,RN) = E(xN1,RN1) + E(xN2,RN2)
+ ∑
i∈N1
E(xi,xN2,Ri, R¯, . . . , R¯) + ∑
i∈N2
E(xi,xN1,Ri, R¯, . . . , R¯).
(2.1)
The first two terms in equation (2.1) constitute the within subgroup compo-
nent, the final two terms the between subgroup component. Within subgroup
envy is the sum of the envy levels in the two subgroups. Between subgroup envy
is the sum of the individual envy of each individual toward the other subgroup.
The following lemma says that if an envy measure satisfies normalization
and decomposability, then it measures individual envy by the sum of the indi-
vidual’s elementary envies.
Lemma 2.1. If E satisfies normalization and decomposability, then, for each
social state (xN ,RN) in S and each individual i in N, we have
E(si) = ∑
j∈N
E(xi,x j,Ri, R¯).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of individuals.
8Similar decomposability requirements have been studied in the context of inequality mea-
surement (e.g., Bourguignon, 1979, Cowell, 1980 and Shorrocks, 1980, 1984). The decom-
posability axiom used here most resembles that of Ebert (2010). While we, as is customary,
state the axiom in terms of two subgroups, repeated application of equation (2.1) allows a
decomposition in any number of subgroups.
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Step 1. Let N be such that |N|= 2. Without loss of generality, let N = {i1, i2}.
Let s = (xi1,xi2,Ri1,Ri2) be a social state. By decomposability,
E(si1) = E(xi1 ,Ri1) + E(xi2, R¯)
+ E(xi1,xi2,Ri1, R¯) + E(xi2,xi1, R¯, R¯).
The first, second and final terms are equal to zero by normalization. Hence,
E(si1) = E(xi1,xi2,Ri1 , R¯).
Step 2. Suppose the hypothesis holds for all N such that |N|= n with n≥ 2. We
have to show that it holds for all social states with n+1 individuals.
Let N′ be such that |N′| = n+ 1 and let s = (xN′,RN′) be a social state.
Without loss of generality, let N′ = {i1, i2, . . . , in+1}. Consider the partitioning
of N′ into N′1 = {i1, i2, . . . , in} and N′2 = {in+1}. By decomposability,
E(si1) = E(xN′1,Ri1, R¯, . . . , R¯) + E(xin+1, R¯)
+ E(xi1,xin+1,Ri1, R¯) +
n
∑
k=2
E(xik ,xin+1, R¯, R¯) + E(xin+1 ,xN′1, R¯, . . . , R¯).
The second, fourth and final terms are equal to zero by normalization. Hence,
E(si1) = E(xN′1,Ri1 , R¯, . . . , R¯) + E(xi1,xin+1,Ri1, R¯).
By the induction hypothesis,
E(xN′1,Ri1, R¯, . . . , R¯) =
n
∑
k=1
E(xi1 ,xik ,Ri1, R¯).
Hence,
E(si1) =
n+1
∑
k=1
E(xi1,xik ,Ri1, R¯).
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The following proposition says that an envy measure satisfies normalization
and decomposability if and only if overall envy equals the sum of all elementary
envies.
Proposition 2.1. An envy measure E satisfies normalization and decomposabil-
ity if and only if, for each social state (xN ,RN) in S, we have
E(xN ,RN) = ∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
E(xi,x j,Ri, R¯),
where E(xi,x j,Ri, R¯) = 0 for all individuals i and j in N such that xiRix j.
Proof. It is easy to see that the stated envy measure satisfies normalization and
decomposability. We focus on the reverse implication. The proof is by induction
on the number of individuals.
Step 1. Let N be such that |N|= 2. Without loss of generality, let N = {i1, i2}.
Let s = (xi1,xi2,Ri1 ,Ri2) be a social state. By decomposability,
E(s) = E(xi1,Ri1) + E(xi2,Ri2)
+ E(xi1 ,xi2,Ri1, R¯) + E(xi2,xi1 ,Ri2, R¯).
The first and second terms are equal to zero by normalization. Hence,
E(s) = E(xi1 ,xi2,Ri1, R¯) + E(xi2,xi1 ,Ri2 , R¯).
Step 2. Suppose the hypothesis holds for all N such that |N|= n with n≥ 2. We
have to show that it holds for all social states with n+1 individuals.
Let N′ be such that |N′| = n+ 1 and let s = (xN′,RN′) be a social state.
Without loss of generality, let N′ = {i1, i2, . . . , in+1}. Consider the partitioning
of N′ into N′1 = {i1, i2, . . . , in} and N′2 = {in+1}. By decomposability,
E(s) = E(xN′1,RN′1) + E(xin+1 ,Rin+1)
+
n
∑
k=1
E(xik ,xin+1,Rik , R¯) + E(xin+1 ,xN′1,Rin+1 , R¯, . . . , R¯).
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The second term is equal to zero by normalization. Using, in addition, the
induction hypothesis,
E(s) =
n
∑
k=1
n
∑
ℓ=1
E(xik ,xiℓ,Rik , R¯)
+
n
∑
k=1
E(xik ,xin+1,Rik , R¯) + E(xin+1,xN′1,Rin+1, R¯, . . . , R¯).
By Lemma 2.1,
E(xin+1,xN′1,Rin+1, R¯, . . . , R¯) =
n+1
∑
k=1
E(xin+1,xik ,Rin+1, R¯).
Hence,
E(s) =
n+1
∑
k=1
n+1
∑
ℓ=1
E(xik ,xiℓ,Rik , R¯).
Proposition 2.1 says that overall envy equals the sum of all elementary envies,
but largely leaves open how to measure elementary envy. All it imposes in this
respect is that ‘negative’ elementary envies, i.e., the extent to which individuals
prefer their own bundles to those of others, are not taken into account. In the
next section, we will consider axioms that give more content to the concept of
elementary envy.
2.4 Measuring elementary envy
Consider a setting with two individuals, only one of whom is envious. We
propose axioms that require the envy measure to react to simple changes in the
bundles of the two individuals. The axioms bear on the envy measure E, but
only directly impose properties on the elementary envy measure corresponding
to E.
Betweenness requires the elementary envy of individual i to individual
j to decrease if i’s bundle improves or j’s bundle worsens according to i’s
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preferences. In terms of i’s preferences, the new bundles lie ‘in between’ the
original bundles.
Betweenness. For all individuals i and j inN , all bundles xi, x j, x′i and x′j in X
and each preference relation Ri inR such that x jPixi, we have that x jRix′j, x′jRix′i
and x′iRixi imply E(xi,x j,Ri, R¯)≥ E(x′i,x′j,Ri, R¯) with strict inequality holding
whenever x jPix′j or x′iPixi.
We emphasize an implication of betweenness. Let ui be a utility represen-
tation of the preference relation Ri. Betweenness implies that the elementary
envy E(xi,x j,Ri, R¯) of individual i to j is a function only of the utility levels
ui(xi) and ui(x j). That is, if ui(xi) = ui(x′i) and ui(x j) = ui(x′j) (as depicted in
Figure 2.1), then E(xi,x j,Ri, R¯) = E(x′i,x′j,Ri, R¯). Note that the second and third
Feldman-Kirman measures are in this functional form and satisfy betweenness.
The next axiom captures the idea of gauging elementary envy by the radial
distance between bundles. Consider two approaches. The first approach, as
adopted in the Chaudhuri and Diamantaras-Thomson measures, measures the
elementary envy of i to j using the fraction λi j by which j’s bundle has to be
shrunk in order for i to stop envying j. That is, λi j is such that xiIiλi jx j, and
the higher λi j, the lower the elementary envy of i to j. The second approach
measures the elementary envy of i to j using the factor κi j by which i’s bundle
has to be blown up in order for i to stop envying j. That is, κi j is such that
κi jxiIix j, and the higher κi j, the higher the elementary envy of i to j. The two
approaches are a priori equally appealing, but yield conflicting results. To see
this, consider the social states s1 = (xi,x′j,Ri, R¯) and s2 = (x′i,x j,Ri, R¯) in Figure
2.1. The first approach implies E(s1)> E(s2) because λ ′i j < λi j, whereas the
second approach implies E(s1)< E(s2) because κi j < κ ′i j.9
We do not make a choice among the two conflicting approaches. Instead,
we formulate an axiom that is sufficiently weak to be consistent with both. The
axiom only considers the cases where the bundles of the envied and envious are
proportional to each other (in which case the two above approaches coincide)
9The two approaches do give the same result if the preference relation is homothetic.
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Figure 2.1 Two indifference curves of individual i.
and says that a decrease of the radial distance between these two bundles reduces
elementary envy.
Proportionality. For all individuals i and j inN , all bundles xi, x j, x′i and x′j
in X such that κxi = x j and κ ′x′i = x′j and all preference relations Ri and R′i in
R such that x jPixi and x′jP′i x′i, we have that κ ≥ κ ′ implies E(xi,x j,Ri, R¯) ≥
E(x′i,x′j,R′i, R¯) with strict inequality holding if and only if κ > κ ′.
However, betweenness and proportionality are incompatible: there is no envy
measure that satisfies both axioms. Consider the social states s = (xi,x j,Ri, R¯)
and s′= (x′i,x′j,Ri, R¯) in Figure 2.1. Betweenness implies E(s) = E(s′), whereas
proportionality implies E(s)< E(s′) because κi j < κ ′i j.10 Note that a stronger
clash, with betweenness implying E(s) > E(s′), can easily be constructed as
well.
We treat betweenness as essential and therefore weaken proportionality. The
following axiom requires all bundles to be proportional to a predetermined
reference bundle r. Later we will argue that the axiom may be regarded as a
minimal weakening of proportionality that is compatible with betweenness.
10If the domain of preference relations is restricted to homothetic preferences relations, then
the two axioms are compatible.
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r-Proportionality. There is a bundle r in X such that the following holds. For
all individuals i and j in N , all bundles xi, x j, x′i and x′j in X proportional to
r and such that κxi = x j and κ ′x′i = x′j and all preference relations Ri and R′i
inR such that x jPixi and x′jP′i x′i, we have that κ ≥ κ ′ implies E(xi,x j,Ri, R¯)≥
E(x′i,x′j,R′i, R¯) with strict inequality holding if and only if κ > κ ′.
Before proceeding, we need to define the ρ-utility representation. Let ρ be
a reference bundle in X . Let uρ(xi,Ri) be the real number such that individual i
is indifferent between the fraction uρ(xi,Ri) of the bundle ρ and his own bundle
xi. That is, for a preference relation Ri in R \ {R¯}, we have that uρ(xi,Ri) is
the real number such that xiIiuρ(xi,Ri)ρ . For the preference relation Ri = R¯,
we let uρ(xi,Ri) equal a positive constant. The function uρ( · ,Ri) is a utility
representation of the preference relation Ri.11
The following proposition says that an envy measure satisfies betweenness
and r-proportionality if and only if it measures the elementary envy of individual
i to j by the ratio of i’s ρ-utility levels associated with j’s and i’s bundles.
Moreover, the reference bundle ρ that determines the utility representation has
to be chosen such that ρ = r.
Proposition 2.2. Let E be an envy measure that satisfies anonymity. Then E
satisfies betweenness and r-proportionality if and only if there exists a strictly
increasing function f : R→ R such that for all individuals i and j in N , all
bundles xi and x j in X and each preference relation Ri inR such that x jPixi, we
have
E(xi,x j,Ri, R¯) = f
(
ur(x j,Ri)
ur(xi,Ri)
)
.
Proof. It is easy to see that the stated envy measure satisfies betweenness and
r-proportionality. We focus on the reverse implication.
Let r be a given bundle in X . Let i and j be individuals inN , let xi, x′i, x j
and x′j be bundles in X and let Ri and R′i be preference relations inR such that
x jPixi and x′jP′i x′i. We have to show that
E(xi,x j,Ri, R¯) ≥ E(x′i,x′j,R′i, R¯) (2.2)
11See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011, p. 7) for a discussion of the ρ-utility representation.
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if and only if
ur(x j,Ri)
ur(xi,Ri)
≥ ur(x
′
j,R
′
i)
ur(x′i,R′i)
. (2.3)
Then there exists a strictly increasing function f as stated. Note that f does not
depend on i and j by anonymity.
Let yi, y′i, y j and y′j be bundles in X proportional to r and such that yiIixi,
y′iI′i x′i, y jIix j and y′jI′i x′j. Such bundles exist since Ri and R′i are continuous and
strictly monotonic. Let κ and κ ′ be such that κyi = y j and κ ′y′i = y′j.
Suppose that equation (2.2) holds. We have to show that equation (2.3)
holds as well. By betweenness, we have E(xi,x j,Ri, R¯) = E(yi,y j,Ri, R¯) and
E(x′i,x′j,R′i, R¯) = E(y′i,y′j,R′i, R¯). Hence, E(yi,y j,Ri, R¯)≥ E(y′i,y′j,R′i, R¯). If κ <
κ ′, then we have E(yi,y j,Ri, R¯) < E(y′i,y′j,R′i, R¯) by r-proportionality. Hence,
it must be that κ ≥ κ ′. From the definition of ur, κ = ur(y j,Ri)/ur(yi,Ri) and
κ ′ = ur(y′j,R′i)/ur(y′i,R′i). Since ur(x j,Ri)/ur(xi,Ri) = ur(y j,Ri)/ur(yi,Ri) and
ur(x′j,R′i)/ur(x′i,R′i) = ur(y′j,R′i)/ur(y′i,R′i), we obtain equation (2.3).
Now, suppose that equation (2.3) holds. We have to show that equa-
tion (2.2) holds as well. Equation (2.3) implies that κ = ur(y j,Ri)/ur(yi,Ri)
which is greater than or equal to κ ′ = ur(y′j,R′i)/ur(y′i,R′i). Since κ ≥ κ ′,
E(yi,y j,Ri, R¯) ≥ E(y′i,y′j,R′i, R¯) by r-proportionality. Using betweenness, we
obtain equation (2.2).
The measure of elementary envy in Proposition 2.2 shares with the second
and third Feldman-Kirman measures that it depends on the utility distance
between the bundles of the envious and the envied. However, the utility rep-
resentation used is not an arbitrary choice as in those measures. Rather, the
ρ-utility representation is singled out by the radial distance idea inherent in the
Chaudhuri and Diamantaras-Thomson measures.
Note that, for a given individual i, the criterion in Proposition 2.2 provides a
complete ranking of all social states of the form (xi,x j,Ri, R¯). This means that
any further strengthening of r-proportionality in the direction of proportionality
will either lead to conflicts or is already implied by the combination of r-
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proportionality and betweenness. In this sense, the axiom r-proportionality is
the minimal weakening of proportionality that is compatible with betweenness.
2.5 Main result and discussion
Our main result characterizes the class of envy measures that satisfy normal-
ization, anonymity, decomposability, betweenness and r-proportionality. The
theorem is a straightforward combination of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2.
Theorem 2.1. An envy measure E satisfies normalization, anonymity, decompos-
ability, betweenness and r-proportionality if and only if there exists a function
f : R++→ R+ with f strictly increasing on the interval (1,+∞) and f (t) = 0
for each t ≤ 1 such that, for each social state (xN ,RN) in S, we have
E(xN ,RN) = ∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
f
(
ur(x j,Ri)
ur(xi,Ri)
)
. (2.4)
To understand the role of the function f , it is useful to treat the utility ratio
ur(x j,Ri)/ur(xi,Ri) as a natural cardinalization of the measure of elementary
envy of individual i to individual j. The more convex is f , the more sensitive
is the envy measure E to changes in larger elementary envies (as measured
by the utility ratio) relative to changes in smaller elementary envies. Given
a sufficiently convex f , the measure that equates overall envy to the largest
elementary envy, as in the Diamantaras-Thomson measure, can be approximated
arbitrarily closely. Similarly, choosing f sufficiently concave delivers the other
extreme that identifies overall envy with the minimal elementary envy.
We discuss two variants of Theorem 2.1. The first concerns the aggregation
of elementary envies into overall envy, the second the definition of elementary
envy.
First, not all envy measures that have been proposed take the form of a sum
over the elementary envies. Fleurbaey (2008, Chapter 2)’s measure equates
the individual envy of i to his maximal elementary envy E(si) = max j∈N E(si j)
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and overall envy to the sum of all individual envies E(s) = ∑i∈N E(si).12 This
measure, contrary to the measures in Theorem 2.1, does not depend only on the
values of the elementary envies, but also on their distribution over the individuals.
Such a genuine role for the individual envies can be allowed by replacing
decomposability by two simple positive responsiveness axioms. The first axiom
requires individual envy to increase if at least one individual’s elementary envy
increases, other things equal. The second axiom requires overall envy to increase
if at least one individual envy increases, other things equal. These axioms lead
to a general approach that allows different aggregations for the elementary
envies into individual envy and for the individual envies into overall envy. We
omit the straightforward formal treatment.
Second, we examine how the measure of elementary envy changes if we
focus on the absolute distance between bundles instead of on the relative dis-
tance. The only change to the assumptions in Section 2.2 is that commodities
can take negative or zero values in addition to positive values. We use 1m
to denote the m-vector with a one at each entry. Consider the following ab-
solute version of r-proportionality. Let xi, x j, x′i and x′j be bundles that are
translations of the reference bundle r, and xi + µ1m = x j and x′i + µ ′1m = x′j.
Let x jPixi and x′jPix′i. Then, according to the alternative axiom, µ ≥ µ ′ im-
plies E(xi,x j,Ri, R¯)≥ E(x′i,x′j,R′i, R¯) with strict inequality holding if and only
if µ > µ ′. Replacing r-proportionality by this alternative axiom in Theorem 2.1
yields the following class of measures: for each social state (xN ,RN) in S, we
have
E(xN ,RN) = ∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
g
(
vr(x j,Ri)− vr(xi,Ri)
)
, (2.5)
where vr(xi,Ri) is the real number such that xiIi(r+vr(xi,Ri)1m), and g :R→R
is a function with g strictly increasing on the interval (0,+∞) and g(t) = 0 for
each t ≤ 0. The proof involves a simple adaptation of the proof of Proposition
2.2 and is therefore omitted.
12Fleurbaey’s approach to measure elementary envy is similar to that used in the Chaudhuri
and Diamantaras-Thomson measures.
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2.6 Concluding remark
We conclude with a remark on the connection between envy measures
and inequality measures. The literature on multidimensional inequality mea-
surement focuses on the setting with multiple commodities but homogenous
preferences.13 If Ri = R for each individual i, then the envy measures in equa-
tions (2.4) and (2.5) correspond to so-called two-stage inequality measures.14
The utility vectors, (ur(xi,R))i∈N for (2.4) and (vr(xi,R))i∈N for (2.5), are com-
puted in the first stage. The second stage applies a unidimensional (income)
inequality measure to these utility vectors. For the second stage, it is easy to ob-
tain well-known unidimensional inequality measures such as the absolute Gini
index, the variance and the variance of logarithms as special cases of equations
(2.4) or (2.5).15 This connection suggests envy measurement as a generalization
of the two-stage approach to the setting of heterogenous preferences.
13See Weymark (2006) and Chakravarty (2009) for surveys. While contributions to this
literature do not always explicitly define preferences, an interpretation in terms of (homogenous)
preferences is usually valid (see e.g., Tsui (1995, pp. 252-253).
14Maasoumi (1986) introduced the two-stage approach. See Dardanoni (1995), Weymark
(2006) and Bosmans et al. (2015) for further discussions.
15See Ebert (2010) for definitions of these and other measures covered by equations (2.4)
and (2.5). In a fixed-population setting, the envy measures and inequality measures correspond
exactly. In a variable-population setting, division by 2|N|2 is required to obtain the inequality
measures.
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3LAISSEZ-FAIRE VERSUS PARETO1
3.1 Introduction
Libertarianism ascribes intrinsic value to laissez-faire outcomes. Proponents
of this political philosophy accordingly regard redistributive taxation as an
inherent injustice. For example, Nozick (1974, p. 169) states that “Taxation of
earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor. . . . taking the earnings of n
hours labor is like taking n hours from the person; it is like forcing the person
to work n hours for another’s purpose.” The respect for laissez-faire outcomes
is not restricted to the “rightward” extreme of the liberal spectrum. It is also a
component of egalitarian liberalism, which disapproves redistribution to redress
inequalities resulting from the exercise of personal responsibility.2
We introduce a “laissez-faire” principle to capture the above ethical role
for laissez-faire outcomes. To do so, we distinguish between an individual’s
market income (without government intervention) and her disposable income
(after government intervention). Consider a social state in which disposable
incomes coincide with market incomes. The laissez-faire principle simply says
1This chapter is based on collaborative work with Kristof Bosmans.
2As Arneson (1990, p. 176) puts it, “distributive justice does not recommend any intervention
by society to correct inequalities that arise through the voluntary choice or fault of those who
end up with less, so long as it is proper to hold the individuals responsible for the voluntary
choice or faulty behavior that gives rise to the inequalities.” Inequalities arising from other
sources do call for redistribution according to egalitarian liberalism. See also Dworkin (1981b),
Rawls (1982) and Cohen (1989).
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that redistribution that moves disposable incomes away from market incomes
(while preserving total income) results in a socially worse social state.
We show that the laissez-faire principle, when combined with the Pareto
principle, puts strong demands on the social ranking. According to the weak
Pareto principle, an increase in the disposable income (which we assume to
measure utility) of every individual is a social improvement. Our main result
says that a social ranking satisfies laissez-faire and weak Pareto only if it
maximizes total disposable income (Theorem 3.1). That is, with the exception
of comparisons involving equal total disposable incomes, the social ranking
must ignore distributional considerations altogether. The result is striking,
as it is counter to treating the relationship between disposable incomes and
market incomes as intrinsically important. We further show that there is no
social ranking that satisfies the laissez-faire principle and the Pareto indifference
principle (Theorem 3.2).
Our results reveal a strong tension between the laissez-faire principle and
the Pareto principle. This poses a clear challenge for the important task of
incorporating liberal political philosophies into the standard ‘Paretian’ economic
framework for social evaluation.
3.2 Results
The set of individuals is N = {1, . . . ,n}. For each individual i in N, the real
number xi denotes her disposable income (after government intervention) and the
real number mi denotes her market income (without government intervention).3
Let x = (x1, . . . ,xn) and m = (m1, . . . ,mn). We refer to a pair (x,m) as a social
state.4 The set S = Rn×Rn collects all social states. We assume that each
individual ranks the social states in S in accordance with her own disposable
3Because of individual responses to government intervention, incomes “before” intervention
need not coincide with incomes “without” intervention. The latter are the ones relevant for our
purpose.
4For a social state (x,m), we allow total disposable income ∑i xi to be greater than, equal to
or smaller than total market income ∑i mi. Note that the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 still
work if we impose, for each social state (x,m), that ∑i xi = ∑i mi.
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income. That is, individual i in N weakly prefers social state (x,m) to social
state (x′,m′) if and only if xi ≥ x′i.
The aim is to compare social states on the basis of social welfare. A social
ranking R is a reflexive and transitive binary relation in S. The asymmetric and
symmetric parts of R (‘is at least as good as’) are denoted by P (‘is better than’)
and I (‘is equally good as’).
We impose two principles on the social ranking. The first principle expresses
respect for laissez-faire outcomes. Consider a social state that gives each
individual a disposable income equal to her market income. Laissez-faire
demands that any redistribution (that preserves total disposable income) is
regarded as a social worsening.
Laissez-faire. For all social states (x,m) and (x′,m) in S such that ∑i xi =
∑i x′i = ∑i mi, if x = m and x′ ̸= m, then (x,m)P(x′,m).
The second principle is a weak form of the Pareto principle. Weak Pareto
requires that an increase in the disposable income of every individual is regarded
as a social improvement.
Weak Pareto. For all social states (x,m) and (x′,m′) in S, if xi > x′i for each i
in N, then (x,m)P(x′,m′).
Our main result says that the combination of laissez-faire and weak Pareto
forces the social ranking to maximize total disposable income.
Theorem 3.1. If a social ranking R satisfies laissez-faire and weak Pareto, then,
for all social states (x,m) and (x′,m′) in S,
∑i xi > ∑i x′i implies (x,m)P(x′,m′).
Proof. Let R satisfy laissez-faire and weak Pareto. Let (x,m) and (x′,m′) be
social states in S such that ∑i xi > ∑i x′i. We will show that (x,m)P(x′,m′). Let
1n be the n-vector with a one at each entry.
First, assume that there is a positive real number µ such that x = (x′+µ1n).
Then we have (x,m)P(x′,m′) by weak Pareto.
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Next, assume that there is no positive real number µ such that x= (x′+µ1n).
Let δ be the positive real number for which ∑i xi−∑i x′i = 2δn.
By weak Pareto, we have
(x,m)P(x−δ1n,x−δ1n).
Note that ∑i(xi − δ ) = ∑i(x′i + δ ) and, by the above assumption, we have
(x−δ1n) ̸= (x′+δ1n). Hence, by laissez-faire, we have
(x−δ1n,x−δ1n)P(x′+δ1n,x−δ1n).
By weak Pareto, we have
(x′+δ1n,x−δ1n)P(x′,m′).
Using transitivity, we obtain (x,m)P(x′,m′).
Laissez-faire and weak Pareto are surprisingly demanding if imposed jointly
on a social ranking.5 Comparisons of social states with different total disposable
incomes must be made solely on the basis of total disposable income. In all
such comparisons, the social ranking must therefore ignore the relationship
between disposable incomes and market incomes. Proponents of liberal political
philosophies may find this implication hard to swallow. They may reject, for
example, a policy that only marginally increases total disposable income, but at
the cost of a major shift of disposable incomes away from market incomes.6
5The following example shows that there exist social rankings that satisfy laissez-faire and
weak Pareto. For each social state (x,m) in S, let v(x−m) denote the variance of the vector
x−m = (x1−m1, . . . ,xn−mn). Let R be the social ranking such that, for all social states (x,m)
and (x′,m′) in S, we have that (i) if ∑i xi > ∑i x′i, then (x,m)P(x′,m′) and (ii) if ∑i xi = ∑i x′i,
then (x,m)R(x′,m′) if and only if v(x−m) ≤ v(x′−m′). The (complete) social ranking R
satisfies laissez-faire and weak Pareto.
6Consider an example with two individuals. Let (x,m) be such that x = m = (0,100) and
let (x′,m) be such that x′ = (100+ ε,0) with ε > 0. It is clear that in social state (x′,m) the
disposable incomes and market incomes are far apart. A mild extension of laissez-faire would
be that (x,m) should be socially preferred to (x′,m) for some small ε > 0. But Theorem 3.1
says that (x′,m)P(x,m) for each ε > 0.
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Next, we consider the implications of strengthening weak Pareto. The ‘full’
Pareto principle is usually defined as the combination of strong Pareto and
Pareto indifference. Strong Pareto demands that if the disposable income of
at least one individual increases and the disposable income of no individual
decreases, then this is deemed a social improvement.
Strong Pareto. For all social states (x,m) and (x′,m′) in S, if xi ≥ x′i for each i
in N with at least one strict inequality, then (x,m)P(x′,m′).
Pareto indifference requires that if each individual is indifferent between
two social states, i.e., has the same disposable income in both, then these two
social states are regarded as socially equally good.
Pareto indifference. For all social states (x,m) and (x′,m′) in S, if xi = x′i for
each i in N, then (x,m) I (x′,m′).
A direct implication of Theorem 3.1 is that the combination of laissez-faire
and weak Pareto implies strong Pareto.
Corollary 1. If a social ranking R satisfies laissez-faire and weak Pareto, then
R satisfies strong Pareto.
Pareto indifference cannot, however, be combined with laissez-faire. Hence,
a social ranking that satisfies laissez-faire must violate the full Pareto principle.
Theorem 3.2. There is no social ranking that satisfies laissez-faire and Pareto
indifference.
Proof. Assume that R is a social ranking that satisfies laissez-faire and Pareto
indifference.
Let x and x′ in Rn be such that ∑i xi =∑i x′i and x ̸= x′. We have (x,x′) I (x,x)
by Pareto indifference, (x,x)P(x′,x) by laissez-faire. Pareto indifference implies
(x′,x) I (x′,x′). Thus, by transitivity, (x,x′)P(x′,x′). But we have (x′,x′)P(x,x′)
by laissez-faire.
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To end this section, we discuss the relation between our results and a result
by Kaplow and Shavell (2001, p. 284), which states that a social ranking “that is
not purely welfarist violates the Pareto principle”. Laissez-faire makes the social
ranking non-welfarist, as it makes it dependent on non-preference information,
viz., the market incomes. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to regard Theorem
3.2 as a mere implication of the result by Kaplow and Shavell (2001). What
their result in fact shows is that a complete and continuous7 social ranking that
satisfies weak Pareto (which they identify with the Pareto principle) must satisfy
Pareto indifference (which they identify with welfarism).8 Therefore, the result
of Kaplow and Shavell concerns a relationship between two components of
the full Pareto principle, whereas our results in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 concern
relationships between a component of the full Pareto principle on the one hand
and the (non-welfarist) laissez-faire principle on the other hand.
3.3 Conclusion
The economic literature has traditionally stressed the role of laissez-faire
as an instrument for welfare maximization. Our results show the difficulties
in treating the respect for laissez-faire outcomes as an end in itself. If the full
Pareto principle is required, then no social ranking can satisfy the laissez-faire
principle. If only weak Pareto is required, then there are possibilities, but these
are very restricted. In cases where the social states differ in total disposable
income, market incomes must be ignored and the social state with greater total
disposable income must be chosen, leaving little room for liberal values.
We end with a digression on two taxation principles, viz., equal sacrifice
and liberal reward. Interpret m as the pre-tax income distribution and x as the
post-tax income distribution. The question is how to divide the total tax burden
∑i mi−∑i xi among the individuals. The equal sacrifice principle says that taxes
7A social ranking R satisfies continuity if, for all social states (x,m) and (y,m) in S, if a
sequence of vectors {yk}k∈N converges to y and (x,m)R(yk,m) (respectively, (yk,m)R(x,m))
for each k in N, then (x,m)R(y,m) (respectively, (y,m)R(x,m)).
8See also the exchange between Fleurbaey et al. (2003) and Kaplow and Shavell (2004).
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should be such that each individual incurs the same utility loss.9 Let u : R→ R
be an increasing function, to be interpreted as the common utility function. The
equal sacrifice principle demands that, for all social states (x,m) and (x′,m) in S
such that ∑i xi = ∑i x′i, if u(x1)−u(m1) = u(x2)−u(m2) = · · ·= u(xn)−u(mn)
and x ̸= x′, then (x,m)P(x′,m). It is immediate that equal sacrifice implies
laissez-faire. Indeed, equal sacrifice implies that if the tax burden ∑i mi−∑i xi is
zero (the case laissez-faire deals with), then pre-tax income and post-tax income
should coincide.
The liberal reward principle says that, if individuals differ only with respect
to responsibility characteristics, then taxes should be such that each individual
incurs the same income loss.10 The liberal reward principle is obtained from
the equal sacrifice principle by setting u equal to the identity function. Again,
provided we regard all individuals as equals with respect to non-responsibility
characteristics, liberal reward implies laissez-faire.
Both equal sacrifice and liberal reward extend laissez-faire. By consequence,
our results are also relevant for the study of these principles. The principles are
difficult to incorporate into a social ranking together with the natural requirement
of the Pareto principle.11
9The equal sacrifice principle was proposed by, among others, Mill (1865). See Musgrave
(1959) for a historical account. For modern uses of the principle, see, e.g., Young (1987, 1990)
and Weinzierl (2014).
10The principle is one of the two components of the equality of opportunity idea of egalitarian
liberalism (see Section 3.1), the other being the compensation principle, which says that
taxes should be such that post-tax incomes of individuals who differ only with respect to
non-responsibility characteristics are equal. On this literature, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004),
Fleurbaey (2008) and Roemer and Trannoy (2013).
11Theorem 3.1 is particularly interesting in the context of the liberal reward principle. The
result says that in many comparisons we must follow instead what is known as the utilitarian
reward principle, which advocates maximization of incomes rather than, as liberal reward,
minimizing deviations from the market incomes. See Roemer (1993) and Van de gaer (1993).
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4MEASUREMENT OF EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: A
NORMATIVE APPROACH1
4.1 Introduction
The theory of equality opportunity distinguishes between two types of
individual characteristics: circumstances and responsibility characteristics.2
The former are characteristics for which individuals cannot be held responsible
such as gender, race, sexual orientation, parental background and parents’
education. The latter are those we can hold individuals accountable for such
as effort. In the classical approach to inequality measurement, on the other
hand, it is assumed that individuals are homogeneous in all dimensions except
for the outcome in question, and hence any inequality is unfair. However,
we know from social and political debate, surveys (Schokkaert and Devooght,
2003) and economic experiments (Cappelen et al., 2007) that the conception of
fairness adopted by the theory of equality of opportunity might reflect fairness
ideals upheld by people better. More importantly, a society in which people are
not discriminated against on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, gender and
sexual orientation is desirable in itself (Arneson, 2015). Moreover, as argued
by the The World Bank (2005), equality of opportunity rather than equality
of outcomes can be instrumental for economic growth. Indeed, Marrero and
1This chapter is based on collaborative work with Kristof Bosmans.
2See Dworkin (1981a,b), Arneson (1989) and Cohen (1989).
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Rodríguez (2013) find a negative relationship between inequality of opportunity
and growth using Panel Study of Income Dynamics data for the U.S. Equality
of opportunity is thus an important concept normatively and practically.
Two principles are at the heart of equality of opportunity as an ideal: the
principle of compensation and the principle of reward. Compensation says that
circumstances should not have an impact on individuals’ achievements. Two
interpretations of the principle of compensation, ex post compensation and ex
ante compensation, can be found in the literature. This distinction is due to
Ooghe et al. (2007) and Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013).3
The ex post approach to compensation focuses on the income levels of
individuals who share the same responsibility characteristics.4 We propose
two axioms that capture the ex post approach to compensation: ex post Pigou-
Dalton compensation and ex post compensation symmetry. Ex post Pigou-
Dalton compensation says that an income transfer widening the income gap
between two individuals with the same responsibility characteristics reduces
social welfare. Ex post compensation symmetry says that two individuals in the
same responsibility group must be treated in a symmetric way, that is, permuting
their incomes leaves social welfare unchanged.
The ex ante approach to compensation focuses on income distributions
of circumstance groups which are considered to represent opportunity sets of
circumstance groups.5 We use two axioms to capture the ex ante approach to
compensation: ex ante Pigou-Dalton compensation and ex ante compensation
symmetry. Ex ante Pigou-Dalton compensation says that equalizing opportunity
sets of circumstance groups increases social welfare. Ex ante compensation
symmetry says that two circumstance groups should be treated in a symmetric
way, that is, permuting their opportunity sets leaves social welfare unchanged.
3Ooghe et al. (2007) call the ex post approach “the compensating outcomes approach”, and
the ex ante approach “the compensating sets approach”. See also Ramos and Van de gaer (2012)
for discussions of the ex ante ex post distinction.
4For uses of the ex post approach, see Bossert (1995), Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996),
Fleurbaey (1994) and Roemer (1993, 1998a, 2002).
5See, for instance, Kranich (1996), Ok and Kranich (1998) and Van de gaer (1993).
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The second conception of equality of opportunity is the principle of reward.
The principle is concerned with the appropriate amount of inequality due to
differences in responsibility characteristics. Naturally, what is appropriate is
subject to interpretation. We focus on two interpretations of the idea of reward:
liberal reward and utilitarian reward. Utilitarian reward is indifferent to the
manner in which a certain amount of income is distributed within a circumstance
group. Liberal reward, on the other hand, says that laissez-faire outcomes must
be respected within a circumstance group. That is, two individuals with the
same circumstance characteristics must be subjected to the same government
transfer.
In Section 4.4, we investigate the existence of social welfare functions that
satisfy various combinations of compensation and reward. However, we find that
market incomes must be additively separable if we are to combine liberal Pigou-
Dalton reward with ex post Pigou-Dalton compensation or ex ante compensation
symmetry (Propositions 4.1 and 4.2). That is, the change in the market income
of an individual caused by a change in his responsibility characteristics must be
independent of his circumstances. Consequently, we characterize the class of
welfare functions that combine liberal reward with the compensation principles
in the case of additively separable market incomes only (Theorems 4.1 and
4.2). Moreover, we find that it is impossible to combine ex post compensation
with utilitarian reward (Proposition 4.3). A domain restriction does not make
sense in this case since utilitarian reward is independent of market incomes,
so we present a class of welfare functions that satisfy a weaker version of
utilitarian reward, called uniform utilitarian reward, and ex post Pigou-Dalton
compensation (Theorem 4.4). Table 4.1 summarizes our results.
We also provide the optimal distribution of a given amount of income for
each class of welfare functions. In the classical approach to inequality measure-
ment, the optimal allocation assigns each individual the mean income in the
society since individuals are assumed to be homogeneous. In our responsibility
sensitive framework, on the other hand, fair income of an individual depends
on his individual characteristics and the fairness principles used. Surprisingly,
we find that, if one is only interested in the first-best allocations, the choice
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Table 4.1 Overview of the results.
Axioms Ex post compensation Ex ante compensation
Liberal reward
Theorem 4.1 Theorem 4.2
(with AS∗ market incomes) (with AS market incomes)
Utilitarian reward Incompatible Theorem 4.3
Uniform utilitarian reward Theorem 4.4 Not combined†
∗ AS: additively separable. † We do not attempt to combine the two axioms since utilitarian
reward is compatible with ex ante Pigou-Dalton compensation.
between ex ante and ex post compensation becomes irrelevant if combined with
liberal reward. In this case, both approaches lead to the same allocation rule
(Proposition 4.4).
In Section 4.5, we present our measures of inequality of opportunity. Follow-
ing the procedure proposed by Atkinson (1970) and Kolm (1969), we propose to
measure the inequality of opportunity in an income distribution by the per capita
income that could be destroyed if incomes are distributed fairly and the resulting
income distribution has the same welfare as the original distribution. Each of
our indices is therefore a measure of welfare waste due to unfairness. We show
that this is equivalent to measuring inequality of opportunity in a distribution
by the difference between the welfare at the actual distribution and welfare
at the fair distribution of the same total income (Proposition 4.5). Thus, the
welfare function classes characterized serve as the ethical basis for the inequality
measures in the sense that the inequality of opportunity registered increases as
an income distribution moves further (in terms of welfare difference) from the
optimal distribution.
The axioms defined here can be found in the literature on equality of oppor-
tunity. The main contribution of this paper is in providing a complete picture of
the relationship between compensation and reward axioms. We present social
welfare functions, allocation rules, and inequality measures for each possible
combination of the two principles. Each of these tools interrelates with all
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the others. For instance, for the researcher who wishes to use the inequality
measures here, which social welfare function to use is clear. Similarly, if one
wants to focus only on the first-best allocations, the optimal distribution to
choose is clear depending on one’s fairness perceptions.
4.2 Preliminaries
Each individual is characterized by his circumstance and responsibility
characteristics. The set of all circumstance characteristics is C = {1, . . . ,c} and
the set of all responsibility characteristics is R = {1, . . . ,r}. For simplicity, we
assume that every combination (i, j) in C×R is represented by exactly one
individual. Thus, we refer to each (i, j) as an individual.
We use a c× r real-valued matrix X to represent an income distribution. The
i jth entry of X , denoted by xi j, is the income of individual (i, j). The ith row of
X is denoted by xi· and the jth column is denoted by x· j. The vector xi· can be
interpreted as the income prospect of group i.
We distinguish between an individual’s income with and without government
intervention. We refer to the latter as his market income. The market income
distribution is a matrix M in Rc×r. The distinction between the income and
market income of an individual is needed since the market income distribution
is ethically significant according to the liberal reward principles (Section 4.3.2).
We do not restrict ourselves to income distributions where the sum of market
incomes is equal to the sum of incomes. These two might differ due to individual
responses to government intervention. Additionally, different sums of income
in X and M might be observed due to government policies such as a welfare
program.
We denote by 1n and 1c×r the n-dimensional vector and the c× r matrix
with 1 at each entry, respectively.
We use a social welfare function to compare income distributions. A social
welfare function W :Rc×r →R assigns a real number to each income distribution
in Rc×r. The value W assigns to an income distribution depends on M. We
suppress this in the notation since M is fixed.
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A social welfare function should satisfy a number of basic properties if it
is to serve as the basis of value judgements. We formulate these properties as
axioms.
The first group of axioms is not concerned with the distributional aspects of
the social welfare function.
The first axiom says that increasing the income of an individual is socially
desirable provided that nobody’s income is decreased.
Monotonicity. For all income distributions X and X ′ in Rc×r, if xi j ≥ x′i j for
each individual (i, j) in C×R and xks > x′ks for some individual (k,s) in C×R,
then W (X)>W (X ′).
Continuity ensures that the analysis is not sensitive to small changes in the
distributions of income.
Continuity. The function W is continuous.
The next axiom, translation invariance, says that adding a constant to the
income of each individual does not change the ranking of two income distri-
butions. Translation invariance ensures that the inequality indices we derive
later are absolute. That is, adding the same constant to each income does not
change the level of inequality of opportunity in a distribution. Thus, translation
invariance guarantees that the ethically significant information is the income
difference.6
Translation invariance. For all income distributions X and X ′ in Rc×r and for
each real number λ , we have W (X) ≥W (X ′) if and only if W (X +λ1c×r) ≥
W (X ′+λ1c×r).
The next two axioms are reasonable for a welfare function that takes the
ex ante or ex post approach specifically. Ex ante aggregation says that the
6We do not impose scale invariance (an axiom which says that multiplying each income
with the same constant does not change the ranking of two income distributions) since it is not
compatible with liberal Pigou-Dalton reward and liberal symmetry defined in Section 4.3.2.
See the Appendix.
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social welfare function first aggregates across responsibility groups for each
circumstance group. The obtained values are aggregated across circumstance
groups in the second stage.
Ex ante aggregation. There exist a function φ :Rc→R and functions γ1, . . . ,γc :
Rr → R such that, for each income distribution X in Rc×r, we have W (X) =
φ(γ1(x1·), . . . ,γc(xc·)).
Ex post aggregation says that the social welfare function first aggregates
across circumstance groups for each responsibility group. The obtained values
are aggregated across responsibility groups in the second stage.
Ex post aggregation. There exist a function φ :Rr →R and functions γ1, . . . ,γr :
Rc → R such that, for each income distribution X in Rc×r, we have W (X) =
φ(γ1(x·1), . . . ,γr(x·r)).
Next, we present the principles of fairness.
4.3 Compensation and reward principles
4.3.1 Compensation axioms
Ex post compensation axioms focus on individuals with the same responsi-
bility characteristics. The first, ex post Pigou-Dalton compensation, states that
an income transfer widening the income gap between two members of the same
responsibility group reduces social welfare.
Ex post Pigou-Dalton compensation. For all income distributions X and X ′ in
Rc×r, if there exist two individuals (i, j) and (k, j) in C×R such that xi j ≥ xk j
and a positive real number δ such that x′i j = xi j +δ and x′k j = xk j−δ with X
and X ′ coinciding everywhere else, then W (X)>W (X ′).
A complementary idea to ex post Pigou-Dalton compensation is that if one
individual has more income than another member of the same responsibility
group, the social welfare function should be indifferent to which circumstance
group the richer individual belongs to. Ex post compensation symmetry captures
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this idea. The axiom says that permuting the incomes of two individuals in the
same responsibility group does not change social welfare.
Ex post compensation symmetry. For all income distributions X and X ′ in
Rc×r, if there exist two individuals (i, j) and (k, j) in C×R such that xi j = x′k j
and xk j = x′i j with X and X ′ coinciding everywhere else, then W (X) =W (X ′).
With the exception of Ooghe et al. (2007), ex post compensation symmetry
is not an axiom commonly used in the literature. However, we believe that it is
an important part of the ex post approach to compensation as the principle says
that circumstances should not have an impact on individual achievements. Now
imagine a social welfare function which does not satisfy ex post compensation
symmetry. Suppose that there exist two income distributions X and X ′ such that
xi j > xk j, and X ′ is obtained via a permutation of income levels of (i, j) and
(k, j) with X and X ′ coinciding everywhere else. Now, having W (X)>W (X ′)
means that (i, j) is favoured since the distribution he has a higher income in is
valued more by the social welfare function. This is not justifiable from the point
of view of compensation.
The next axiom, ex ante Pigou-Dalton compensation, is implied by ex
post Pigou-Dalton compensation. Assume that, in an income distribution, the
minimum income in a circumstance group i is higher than the maximum income
in another circumstance group k. In such a situation, we can unambiguously
conclude that group i is better off than group k. Imagine we take away an
amount δ from every individual in the worse-off group, and give δ to each
individual in the better-off group. Ex ante Pigou-Dalton compensation says that
such a transfer reduces welfare.
Ex ante Pigou-Dalton compensation. For all income distributions X and X ′ in
Rc×r, if there exist two circumstance groups i and k in C such that min j∈R xi j ≥
max j∈R xk j and a positive real number δ such that x′i· = xi·+ δ1r and x′k· =
xk·−δ1r with X and X ′ coinciding everywhere else, then W (X)>W (X ′).
Ex ante Pigou-Dalton compensation is based on the idea that equality of
opportunity needs to focus only on the income prospects (i.e., the vectors xi·)
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of different circumstance groups. In this interpretation, equal prospects mean
equal opportunities and hence, ex ante Pigou-Dalton compensation requires
equalizing the opportunities of circumstance groups.7 Additionally, unlike its
ex post counterpart, ex ante Pigou-Dalton compensation demands no infor-
mation on responsibility characteristics. This can be an empirical advantage
since responsibility characteristics are not always observable.8 Fleurbaey and
Peragine (2013) find an incompatibility between what is called ex ante and ex
post compensation in their context. This, however, is not the case in our setting.
In fact, ex ante Pigou-Dalton compensation is implied by ex post Pigou-Dalton
compensation.
A complementary idea to ex ante Pigou-Dalton compensation is that the
different circumstance groups should be treated in a symmetric way. That
is, their income distribution vectors can be permuted without influencing the
social welfare level. This idea is captured by ex ante compensation symmetry.
The axiom says that permuting two rows of an income distribution X does not
change social welfare. Note that, ex post compensation symmetry implies ex
ante compensation symmetry. This is not surprising given the fact that ex post
Pigou-Dalton compensation implies ex ante Pigou-Dalton compensation.
Ex ante compensation symmetry. For all income distributions X and X ′ in
Rc×r, if there exist two circumstance groups i and k such that xi· = x′k· and
xk· = x′i· with X and X ′ coinciding everywhere else, then W (X) =W (X ′).
4.3.2 Reward axioms
Reward principles set the appropriate income distribution within a circum-
stance group based on responsibility characteristics. The two main principles of
reward defined in the literature are liberal reward and utilitarian reward. Liberal
reward and utilitarian reward differ in terms of their attitude towards respon-
sibility. The former says that redistribution should stop once every difference
7See Kranich (1996), Ok and Kranich (1998) and Ooghe et al. (2007) for such an interpreta-
tion.
8Effort exerted is an example of a commonly used, unobservable responsibility characteristic.
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between individuals can be attributed to responsibility, whereas the latter is
indifferent between any two distributions of the same total income within a
circumstance group.9
First, we define liberal Pigou-Dalton reward. Liberal Pigou-Dalton reward
demands that differences in market incomes due to responsibility characteristics
be respected. That is, two individuals in the same circumstance group should be
subjected to the same government transfer.
Consider two individuals (i, j) and (i,s) who are members of the same
circumstance group. The government transfers received by (i, j) and (i,s) are
xi j−mi j and xis−mis. Assume that the government transfer received by (i, j) is
larger than the government transfer received by (i,s). Liberal reward says that
transferring income from (i,s) to (i, j) reduces welfare since such an income
transfer further widens the gap between the government transfers received by
(i,s) and (i, j).
Liberal Pigou-Dalton reward. For all income distributions X and X ′ in Rc×r,
if there exist two individuals (i, j) and (i,s) in C×R such that xi j −mi j ≥
xis−mis and a positive real number δ such that x′i j = xi j +δ and x′is = xis−δ
with X and X ′ coinciding everywhere else, then W (X)>W (X ′).
Let us illustrate the axiom with a simple example. Imagine a society with
one circumstance group and three responsibility groups. Let X and X ′ be such
that X = (7,7,13) and X ′ = (8,6,13). Assume M = (7,9,14). Note that the
distributions of government transfers in X and X ′ are X−M = (0,−2,−1) and
X ′−M = (1,−3,−1), respectively. The government transfers received by the
individuals in the first and second responsibility groups are closer to each other
in X than in X ′. Thus, liberal Pigou-Dalton reward considers X better than X ′.
The best distribution of the total income in X and X ′ with respect to liberal
Pigou-Dalton reward is (6,8,13) since each individual receives a transfer of −1
in this case.
Liberal symmetry, similar to ex post and ex ante compensation symmetry,
presents a complementary idea to liberal Pigou-Dalton reward. It says that
9See Fleurbaey (2008) for a detailed discussion of these two principles.
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permuting the government transfers received by two individuals in the same cir-
cumstance group leaves social welfare unchanged. Note that such a permutation
does not alter the total income of the circumstance group.
Liberal symmetry. For all income distributions X and X ′ in Rc×r, if there
exist two individuals (i, j) and (i,s) in C×R such that xi j−mi j = x′is−mis and
xis−mis = x′i j−mi j with X and X ′ coinciding everywhere else, then W (X) =
W (X ′).
To explain liberal symmetry, let M = (7,9,14) and X ′′ = (5,9,13). Note
that we have X ′′−M = (−2,0,−1). Liberal symmetry says that W should
be indifferent between X ′′ and X = (7,7,13) since X ′′−M = (−2,0,−1) is
obtained from X−M = (0,−2,−1) by a permutation.
The second reward principle we define is utilitarian reward. Utilitarian
reward requires the social welfare function to be neutral to the specific way
that a given amount of income is distributed among members of a circumstance
group.10
Utilitarian reward. For all income distributions X and X ′ in Rc×r, if there
exist two individuals (i, j) and (i,s) in C×R and a positive real number δ such
that x′i j = xi j +δ and x′is = xis−δ with X and X ′ coinciding everywhere else,
then W (X) =W (X ′).
Utilitarian reward is based on the idea that fairness need not be concerned
with inequalities due to responsibility. Utilitarian reward is indifferent between
X = (7,7,13) and X ′ = (8,6,13) in the example above, unlike liberal Pigou-
Dalton reward which considers X better than X ′.
Proposition 4.3 in the next section shows that utilitarian reward is incom-
patible with ex post Pigou-Dalton compensation. Uniform utilitarian reward
is a weaker version of utilitarian reward that is compatible with ex post Pigou-
Dalton compensation. The axiom says that transferring the same amount δ from
everyone in a responsibility group to everyone in another responsibility group
does not alter social welfare.
10A slightly different version of utilitarian reward has been used by, for example, Checchi
and Peragine (2010), Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) and Ooghe et al. (2007).
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Uniform utilitarian reward. For all income distributions X and X ′ in Rc×r, if
there exist two responsibility groups j and s in R and a positive real number δ
such that x′· j = x· j +δ1c, x′·s = x·s−δ1c with X and X ′ coinciding everywhere
else, then W (X) =W (X ′).
We present the characterization results in the next section.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Compensation and liberal reward
In this section, we present the classes of social welfare functions that com-
bine liberal reward with compensation.
In Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, we assume that market incomes are additively
separable. We say that market incomes are additively separable if mi j−mis =
mk j−mks for all circumstance groups i and k and all responsibility groups j and
s.11 That is, a change in the responsibility characteristics of an individual leads
to the same change in his market income regardless of his circumstances.
This restriction is necessary to combine liberal reward with ex post Pigou-
Dalton compensation.12
Proposition 4.1. If a social welfare function W satisfies ex post Pigou-Dalton
compensation and liberal Pigou-Dalton reward, then market incomes must be
additively separable.
Let us illustrate this impossibility with a simple example. Assume that c= 2
and r = 2. Consider
11The literature uses an income function f where f (i, j) is the market income of (i, j). Market
incomes are said to be additively separable if there exist functions g and h such that for each
(i, j), we have f (i, j) = g(i)+h( j). An equivalent condition for the additive separability of f is
that we have f (i, j)− f (i,s) = f (k, j)− f (k,s). Thus, our definition of additive separability is
the same as the one used in the literature.
12Necessity of additively separable market incomes in order to combine ex post Pigou-Dalton
compensation and liberal Pigou-Dalton reward has been shown by Bossert (1995), Bossert and
Fleurbaey (1996) and Fleurbaey (1994, 1995) in the context of allocation rules and by Fleurbaey
(2008) and Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013) in a context of social rankings.
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X =
[
5 6
5 6
]
and M =
[
0 3
1 0
]
.
Note that market incomes are not additively separable. Liberal Pigou-Dalton
reward considers it an improvement to transfer 1 unit of income from individual
(1,1) to individual (1,2) since this equalizes the government transfers received
by these two individuals. Similarly, transferring 1 unit of income from individual
(2,2) to individual (2,1) is an improvement. We therefore reach the distribution
X ′ =
[
4 7
6 5
]
.
By liberal Pigou-Dalton reward, W (X ′) >W (X). By ex post Pigou-Dalton
compensation, on the other hand, W (X)>W (X ′) since the equality of incomes
within responsibility groups is distorted in X ′.
We find that the same restriction is needed for a welfare function to satisfy
liberal Pigou-Dalton reward and ex ante compensation symmetry.
Proposition 4.2. If a social welfare function W satisfies liberal Pigou-Dalton
reward and ex ante compensation symmetry, then market incomes must be
additively separable.
To see the incompatibility, consider
M =
[
2 4
10 14
]
, X =
[
11 13
10 14
]
and X ′ =
[
10 14
11 13
]
.
Note that market incomes are not additively separable. By ex ante compensation
symmetry, W (X) =W (X ′). By liberal Pigou-Dalton reward, however, we have
W (X)>W (X ′)
Before presenting the characterization results, we need to introduce new
notation. For each i in C, let µ i be the r-dimensional vector obtained by
subtracting the minimum income in the vector mi· from each component of mi·.
That is, µ i = (mi1−min{mi1, . . . ,mir}, . . . ,mir−min{mi1, . . . ,mir}). Note that
market incomes are additively separable if and only if there exists a vector µ
in Rr such that µ i = µ for each circumstance group i in C. We call the vector
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µ the summary vector since it describes the manner in which market income
changes across responsibility groups. In the next two theorems, we make use of
a vector µ defined this way.
Theorem 4.1 presents the class of social welfare functions that combine
ex post compensation with liberal reward when market incomes are additively
separable. The social welfare function in (4.1) first subtracts the vector µ from
each income at X . The resulting vectors are evaluated by a translatable13 and
Schur-concave14 function f . Subtracting µ ensures that the welfare function
satisfies liberal Pigou-Dalton reward and its symmetry counterpart.
We denote by Rcr the set of c× r-dimensional real valued vectors.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that market incomes are additively separable with
summary vector µ in Rr. A social welfare function W satisfies monotonicity,
continuity, translation invariance, liberal symmetry, ex post compensation sym-
metry, liberal Pigou-Dalton reward and ex post Pigou-Dalton compensation
if and only if there exists a strictly increasing, continuous, translatable and
Schur-concave function f : Rcr → R such that, for each X in Rc×r,
W (X) = f (x1·−µ,x2·−µ, . . . ,xc·−µ). (4.1)
Theorem 4.2 presents the class of ex ante social welfare functions that com-
bine compensation with liberal reward when market incomes are additively
separable. The social welfare function in (4.2) aggregates in two steps. In the
first step, the welfare function focuses on the income distributions of circum-
stance groups. The vector µ is subtracted from each row of X . The resulting
vectors are evaluated by a unit-translatable and Schur-concave function g. Note
that a difference between two elements of the vector xi·− µ is the difference
between the government transfers received by the corresponding individuals.
13A function f :Rn →R is unit-translatable if f (x+δ1n) = f (x)+δ for every real number δ .
The function is translatable if there exist a strictly increasing function φ and a unit-translatable
function g such that, for each x in Rn, we have f (x) = φ(g(x)).
14A function f : Rn → R is Schur concave if f (Bx) ≥ f (x) for all x in Rn and all n× n
bistochastic matrices B. A bistochastic matrix is a nonnegative square matrix of which each row
sum and each column sum is equal to 1. Note that Schur-concavity implies symmetry of f .
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Hence, this step ensures that social welfare increases if the government transfers
received by two individuals in the same circumstance group are equalized.
In the second step, the values assigned by g are aggregated via a Schur-
concave and translatable function f . Note that, since g is unit-translatable and
f is S-concave, transferring the same δ from each individual in a better-off
circumstance group to each individual in a worse-off one increases welfare.
Hence, the second step ensures that equalizing income prospects of circumstance
groups is considered an improvement by the function W .
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that market incomes are additively separable with
summary vector µ in Rr. A social welfare function W satisfies monotonicity,
continuity, translation invariance, ex ante aggregation, liberal symmetry, ex
ante compensation symmetry, liberal Pigou-Dalton reward and ex ante Pigou-
Dalton compensation if and only if there exists a strictly increasing, continuous,
translatable and Schur-concave function f : Rc → R and a strictly increasing,
continuous, unit-translatable and Schur-concave function g : Rr → R such that,
for each X in Rc×r,
W (X) = f (g(x1·−µ), . . . ,g(xc·−µ)). (4.2)
The welfare function class characterized above is large in the sense that one
can choose the functions f and g in many different ways. This, in turn, implies
that very simple choices for f and g are available. For instance, one can choose
f and g in (4.2) such that W (X) =∑i∈Cωi∑ j∈Rθ j(xi j−µ), where ∑i∈Cωi = 1,
∑ j∈Rθ j = 1 and the weight assigned decreases as the value of the corresponding
element increases. That is, both f and g are weighted sums of their arguments
where the weights are chosen to ensure that the functions are Schur-concave.
Weighted sums can also be used for the three classes characterized below.
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4.4.2 Compensation and utilitarian reward
The next theorem presents the class of social welfare functions that combine
utilitarian reward with ex ante compensation.15 The social welfare function in
(4.3) focuses on the sums of incomes received by circumstance groups. Since
f is Schur-concave, equalizing the total incomes of two circumstance groups
is considered an improvement by a social welfare function in this class. The
functions are indifferent to how that sum is allocated within a circumstance
group due to utilitarian reward.
Theorem 4.3. A social welfare function W satisfies monotonicity, continuity,
translation invariance, ex ante compensation symmetry, utilitarian reward
and ex ante Pigou-Dalton compensation if and only if there exists a strictly
increasing, continuous, translatable and Schur-concave function f : Rc → R
such that, for each X in Rc×r,
W (X) = f (
r
∑
j=1
x1 j, . . . ,
r
∑
j=1
xc j). (4.3)
Van de gaer (1993) proposed a well-known method to compare distributions
on the basis of equality of opportunity. The Van de gaer rule considers an
income distribution X better than a distribution X ′ if the lowest sum of incomes
of circumstance groups in X is higher than that in X ′. That is, the Van de
gaer rule can be represented by a social welfare function WV : Rc×r → R such
that, for each X in Rc×r, we have WV (X) = mini∈C∑ j∈R xi j. Although it is not
strictly increasing, the Van de gaer rule can be approached arbitrarily closely by
a function in (4.3) if f is chosen to be concave enough.
We run into an impossibility in combining ex post Pigou-Dalton compensa-
tion with utilitarian reward.16 We present the proposition without a proof since
the counterexample below suffices.
15Monotonicity and utilitarian reward imply ex ante aggregation, so we do not include the
latter in the theorem.
16Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013) show a similar incompatibility.
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Proposition 4.3. There exists no social welfare function W : Rc×r → R that
satisfies ex post Pigou-Dalton compensation and utilitarian reward.
To see the clash, consider
X =
[
8 7
6 9
]
and X ′ =
[
7 8
7 8
]
.
Ex post Pigou-Dalton compensation implies W (X ′)>W (X). Utilitarian reward,
on the other hand, implies W (X) =W (X ′).
Clearly, a domain restriction is not possible in this case since utilitarian
reward does not take market incomes into account. We therefore weaken
utilitarian reward to uniform utilitarian reward so as to make it compatible with
ex post Pigou-Dalton compensation. Theorem 4.4 presents the social welfare
functions that combine uniform utilitarian reward with ex post compensation.
The function g in (4.4) ensures that equalizing the incomes of two individuals
in the same responsibility group is registered as an improvement by the social
welfare function.
Theorem 4.4. A social welfare function W satisfies monotonicity, continuity,
translation invariance, ex post aggregation, ex post compensation symmetry,
ex post Pigou-Dalton compensation and uniform utilitarian reward if and only
if there exists a strictly increasing and continuous function φ : R→ R, and a
strictly increasing, continuous, unit-translatable and Schur-concave function
g : Rc → R such that, for each X in Rc×r,
W (X) = φ(
r
∑
j=1
g(x· j)). (4.4)
Another well-known criterion of equality of opportunity is the Roemer rule
(Roemer, 1993, 1998a, 2002). A social welfare function that represents the
Roemer rule is a function WR :Rc×r →R such that, for each X in Rc×r, we have
WR(X) = ∑ j∈R mini∈C xi j. A function in (4.4) approximates the Roemer rule if
g is chosen to be concave enough.
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A modification to the proposals of Roemer and Van de gaer was proposed
by Ooghe et al. (2007). The so-called flexible Van de gaer and Roemer rules
they define belong to the classes characterized in (4.3) and (4.4).
4.5 Inequality measures
We follow the procedure proposed by Atkinson (1970) and Kolm (1969) to
define our measure of inequality of opportunity. Let W : Rc×r → R be a social
welfare function and X an income distribution in Rc×r. Let Xˆ be an income
distribution such that the total income in Xˆ is optimally distributed according
to W and Xˆ has the same welfare as X . The inequality of opportunity measure
is a function I : Rc×r → R that measures the inequality of opportunity in X by
the difference between the average income in X and the average income in Xˆ .17
That is,
I(X) =
1
cr
(
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈R
xi j−∑
i∈C
∑
j∈R
xˆi j
)
.
Note that I(X) is the maximum amount of income that could be taken away
from each individual without sacrificing any welfare. Hence, I is a measure of
waste due to the suboptimal allocation of income.
To be able to measure inequality of opportunity, we need to know how in-
come is distributed in Xˆ . That is, we need to know what the optimal distribution
is for a given social welfare function.18 In the classical approach to unidimen-
sional inequality measurement, this step is straightforward. The optimum is
unique: it is the distribution in which each individual is given the same income.
This is however not the case in our context. The optimal distribution of a certain
amount of income depends on which of the four classes (characterized in the
previous section) the social welfare function belongs to.
Proposition 4.4 shows the set of optimal distributions for these four cases.
Part 1 of the proposition shows the optimal distribution for a social welfare
function that combines liberal reward with compensation. Surprisingly, we find
17Note that the average income in Xˆ is typically less than the average income in X .
18A distribution Y is the optimal distribution of a given amount of total income if W (Y )≥
W (Y ′) for every Y ′ with the same total income.
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that the optimal income distributions for the ex ante and ex post approaches
coincide in this case. Thus, the choice of ex ante and ex post becomes irrelevant
if one focuses only on the fair allocation for liberal reward and compensation.
At the optimal distribution, every individual (i, j) is given his summary income
µ j plus α , where α is a constant that ensures that the income in X is fully
distributed. Part 2 (a) presents the optimal distribution chosen by a function
that combines utilitarian reward and compensation with an ex ante approach.
In this case, the optimal distribution gives each circumstance group the same
total income. Due to utilitarian reward, the manner in which this total income is
distributed within a circumstance group is irrelevant. For the ex post counterpart,
in part 2 (b), the optimum is obtained by equalizing incomes of individuals
within responsibility groups. Members of one responsibility group might receive
a higher income than the members of another group in this case.
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Proposition 4.4.
1. Let W be a social welfare function that belongs to the class characterized
in Theorem 4.1 or 4.2. For each income distribution X in Rc×r, the
unique optimal distribution of the total income in X, denoted by X∗, is
such that, for all i in C, x∗i·= µ+α(X)1r, where α(X) = (∑i∈C∑ j∈R xi j−
c∑i∈R µi)/cr.
2. (a) Let W be a social welfare function that belongs to the class charac-
terized in Theorem 4.3. For each income distribution X in Rc×r, a
distribution X∗ is an optimal distribution of the total income in X if
and only if we have ∑ j∈R x∗i j = ∑ j∈R x∗k j for all circumstance groups
i and k in C.
(b) Let W be a social welfare function that belongs to the class charac-
terized in Theorem 4.4. For each income distribution X in Rc×r, a
distribution X∗ is an optimal distribution of the total income in X if
and only if we have x∗i j = x∗k j for all circumstance groups i and k in
C, and each responsibility group j in R.
The optimal distributions given above define allocation rules. In fact, the
optimal distribution chosen by a social welfare function that combines liberal
reward with compensation coincides with the well-known egalitarian-equivalent
allocation rule (Bossert and Fleurbaey, 1996). The rule first chooses a reference
circumstance group, c˜, and then assigns to each (i, j) an income xEEi j = mc˜ j +β ,
where β is a constant to ensure that the income in X is fully distributed. The
egalitarian-equivalent allocation coincides with the allocation presented in the
first part of Proposition 4.4 if c˜ is chosen from the set C.19 Additionally,
the income distributions presented in 2 (a) and 2 (b) above coincide with the
optimal allocations with respect to the the Van de gaer rule and the Roemer rule,
respectively.
19Which circumstance group is chosen as the reference does not matter since market incomes
must be additively separable for a W to satisfy liberal reward and compensation in our context.
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Finally, Proposition 4.5 shows that the inequality measure defined as above
has the intuitive property that the inequality of opportunity in X is a function of
the difference between W (X) and W (X∗) where X∗ is an optimal distribution of
the income in X . That is, the inequality of opportunity assigned to X increases
as it moves further (in terms of welfare) from the optimum. This property makes
the measure very easy to compute since the optima are given in Proposition
4.4.20
Proposition 4.5. For each income distribution X below, let X∗ be an optimal
distribution of the total income in X according to the social welfare function W.
1. Let W be a social welfare function that belongs to the class characterized
in Theorem 4.1 or 4.2 such that f is unit-translatable and f (0,0, . . . ,0) =
0 and g(0,0, . . . ,0) = 0. For each income distribution X in Rc×r, we have
I(X) =W (X∗)−W (X).
2. Let W be a social welfare function that belongs to the class characterized
in Theorem 4.3 or 4.4 such that f is unit-translatable and f (0,0, . . . ,0) =
0 and g(0,0, . . . ,0) = 0. For each income distribution X in Rc×r, we have
I(X) = 1r
(
W (X∗)−W (X)).
We conclude this section with a discussion of how the current study relates
to the literature on equality of opportunity measurement. We do not attempt to
review the vast literature here, but one can say that most measures proposed
so far rely on a counterfactual income distribution obtained from the actual
income distribution.21 The constructed distribution reflects either an income
distribution in which all unacceptable inequalities are removed, or one in which
all unacceptable inequalities due to differences in effort are eliminated, and
20In Proposition 4.5, we take f and g such that each f is unit-translatable, f (0,0, . . . ,0) = 0
and g(0,0, . . . ,0) = 0. This is not restrictive. Any social welfare function characterized in
the previous section can be represented by such a choice of f and g without changing its
ordinal properties. The particular choice of f and g therefore does not change Xˆ , and hence the
inequality level.
21See Ferreira and Peragine (2015), Ramos and Van de gaer (2012) and Roemer and Trannoy
(2013) for reviews.
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hence we are left with a distribution that violates compensation only. In the first
case, inequality of opportunity is measured by the distance between the actual
income distribution and the counterfactual distribution. In the second case, an
inequality index is applied to the counterfactual distribution. Naturally, the
counterfactual distribution depends on the choice of compensation and reward
principles.
Bourguignon et al. (2007), Checchi and Peragine (2010), Ferreira and Gig-
noux (2011) and Peragine (2002) use a counterfactual distribution in which all
inequalities due to differences in effort are eliminated. At this counterfactual
distribution, each individual is given the average income of his circumstance
group. Such a formulation clearly follows utilitarian reward and ex ante com-
pensation. Our measures that combine ex ante compensation with utilitarian
reward (derived through Theorem 4.3, part 2 (a) of Proposition 4.4 and part 2
of Proposition 4.5) can be interpreted as measuring the inequality in the same
counterfactual distribution. Additionally, we allow for alternative counterfac-
tual distributions in which other combinations of compensation and reward are
employed.
Almås et al. (2011) and Devooght (2008) define counterfactual distributions
in which all inequality of opportunity is removed. In their case, the counter-
factual distribution represents the fair income distribution in the society. Both
studies propose to measure inequality of opportunity at a given income dis-
tribution by the distance between the actual income distribution and the fair
income distribution. Almås et al. (2011) use the generalized proportionality
principle developed by Cappelen and Tungodden (2010) as their norm. Their
counterfactual distribution thus employs ex post Pigou-Dalton compensation
and a weaker version of liberal Pigou-Dalton reward (if all individuals have
the same circumstance characteristics, each individual’s fair income is equal
to his pre-tax income). They define the “unfair treatment of an individual” as
the absolute value of the difference between his income and his fair income,
and propose an (unfairness) Gini applied to these differences as their measure
of deviation from the norm. Devooght (2008) proposes to use the measure of
distributional change developed by Cowell (1985) as the distance function. He
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takes the egalitarian-equivalent allocation as the fair distribution. We differ from
Almås et al. (2011) and Devooght (2008) in two important aspects. First, we
do not only focus on combinations of compensation with liberal reward. Our
measures allow for the use of utilitarian reward as well. Second, the norms
(given in Proposition 4.4) and the distance functions (Proposition 4.5) in this
paper are axiomatically derived from the same principles.
The main contribution and the difference of the current study lies in the
fact that we provide a complete and consistent picture: we explicitly derive
underlying welfare criteria, fair distributions and the inequality measures from
the same combinations of principles.
4.6 Conclusion
We conclude by a discussion of three potential directions for future research.
A natural first extension of this paper would be to study the empirical applica-
tions of our measures. The classes of welfare functions and inequality measures
presented here are large in the sense that many possibilities are available for
use in empirical research. A potential difficulty in empirical applications is due
to the necessity of additively separable market functions in case one wants the
evaluation criterion to satisfy compensation and liberal reward. Devooght (2008)
proposes one possible way to tackle this issue. To obtain additively separable
market incomes, Devooght (2008) regresses the market income variable (annual
pre-tax income) on individual characteristics, and chooses to include the error
term in the circumstance set.22 One can then use the estimated equation to
determine market incomes and deduce the vector µ needed for the measurement
of inequality of opportunity in this case.
This paper considers comparisons of income distributions with a fixed set
of circumstance and responsibility characteristics, a weakness we share with
most of the literature. A second natural extension would be to develop measures
22Clearly, one can include the error term in the responsibility set as well. See Devooght
(2008) for more details.
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for comparisons of income distributions with different profiles of individual
characteristics.
A third possible extension would be to focus on multidimensional inequality
of opportunity. That is, developing criteria for the evaluation of distributions
of m commodities – as opposed to just income – among individuals who are
characterized by their responsibility and circumstance characteristics.
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Appendix 4.A
We first show the impossibility mentioned in footnote 5 of this chapter.
Let M = (2,8), X = (3,13) and X ′ = (7,9). By liberal symmetry W (X) =
W (X ′) since X −M = (1,5), X ′−M = (5,1). Now consider 2X = (6,26)
and 2X ′ = (14,18). By liberal Pigou-Dalton reward, W (2X ′)>W (2X) while
W (2X ′) =W (2X) by scale invariance, a contradiction.
We distinguish between two types of income transfers between individuals.
First, a Pigou-Dalton transfer is a transfer of income from a richer to a poorer
individual that results in the initially poorer person ending up with an income
that is less than or equal to the income the initially richer person starts with.
Note that for two income levels x> y, a Pigou-Dalton transfer is at most equal
to x− y. Second, a progressive transfer is a transfer of income from a richer
to a poorer individual such that the one that starts out with less money does
not end up with more than the other. Hence, a progressive transfer is at most
equal to (x− y)/2. Clearly, any progressive transfer is a Pigou-Dalton transfer.
We say that a function is inequality averse if its value increases as a result of a
progressive transfer.
The following two lemmas are used throughout the proofs. The first lemma
can be found in Olkin and Marshall (1979, pp.10-12). See Dasgupta et al. (1973)
and Sen (1973) for the second lemma.
Lemma 4.1. For all vectors a and b in Rn, a is obtained from b by a finite
sequence of Pigou-Dalton transfers if and only if a = bB for some n× n bis-
tochastic matrix B.
Lemma 4.2. Any symmetric, inequality averse function f : Rn → R is Schur-
concave.
In light of Lemma 4.2, it is enough to show that a symmetric function is
inequality averse in order to show it is Schur-concave. That is what we do in
the proofs of the theorems.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Suppose the social welfare function W satisfies liberal
Pigou-Dalton reward and ex post Pigou-Dalton compensation.
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Assume M is not additively separable. That is, there exist i,k in C and
j,s in R such that mi j −mis ̸= mk j −mks. Let X be an income distribution
such that xi j = xk j = (mi j +mk j)/2, xis = xks = (mis +mks)/2 with X and M
coinciding everywhere else. Next, let X ′ be an income distribution such that
x′i j + x′is = xi j + xis with x′i j − x′is = mi j −mis and x′k j + x′ks = xk j + xks with
x′k j− x′ks = mk j−mks with X ′ and M coinciding everywhere else. By liberal
Pigou-Dalton reward, W (X ′)>W (X). By ex post Pigou-Dalton compensation,
on the other hand, W (X)>W (X ′), a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Suppose the social welfare function W satisfies liberal
Pigou-Dalton reward and ex ante compensation symmetry.
Let X be an income distribution such that there exist two positive real
numbers λ , λ ′ such that xi· = mi·+λ1r, and xk· = mk·+λ ′1r with ∑ j∈R xi j =
∑ j∈R xk j with X and M coinciding everywhere else. Let X ′ be an income
distribution obtained from X by permuting the ith and kth rows of X . That is,
xi· = x′k· and xk· = x
′
i· with X and X ′ coinciding everywhere else.
Note that, at xi· and xk·, each individual receives the same government
transfer (λ and λ ′). Moreover, ∑ j∈R xi j = ∑ j∈R xk j. Thus, by liberal Pigou-
Dalton reward, W (X)≥W (X ′) with equality holding only if mi j−mis = mk j−
mks for all j,s in R. But, by ex ante compensation symmetry, we have W (X) =
W (X ′). So, we must have mi j−mis = mk j−mks for all j,s in R. Thus, market
incomes must be additively separable.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Suppose that market incomes are additively separable
with summary vector µ in Rr. Let W be a social welfare function that satisfies
all axioms.
By monotonicity and continuity, there exists a strictly increasing, continu-
ous function fˆ : Rcr → R such that, for each distribution X in Rc×r, W (X) =
fˆ (x1·,x2·, . . . ,xc·).
Next, let us define a new function f : Rcr → R such that, for each X in
Rc×r, fˆ (x1·,x2· . . . ,xc·) = f (x1·−µ,x2·−µ . . . ,xc·−µ). Such a function can be
defined since the c-vector (µ,µ, . . . ,µ) is the same for every c× r dimensional
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vector (x11, . . . ,x1r,x21, . . . ,x2r, . . . ,xc1, . . . ,xcr). The function f inherits strict
increasingness and continuity from fˆ . It is translatable by translation variance.
Next, we show that f is symmetric. Let X ,X ′ be income distributions
such that the vector (x′1·− µ,x′2·− µ, . . . ,x′c·− µ) is obtained from the vector
(x1·−µ,x2·−µ . . . ,xc·−µ) by a single permutation.
Assume the permutation is applied to (i, j) to (k, j) who are in the same
responsibility group. A permutation of xi j− µ j and xk j− µ j is equivalent to
a permutation of xi j and xk j. Thus, by ex post Pigou-Dalton compensation
symmetry, W (X) = W (X ′). Similarly, if the permutation is applied to (i, j)
to (i,s) who are in the same circumstance group, we have W (X) =W (X ′) by
liberal symmetry.
Now, assume the permutation is applied to (i, j) to (k,s). Let Y and X ′′
be income distributions such that yks = xis and xks = yis with Y and X coin-
ciding everywhere else, and x′ks = x
′′
is and x
′
ks = x
′′
is with X
′′ and X ′ coinciding
everywhere else. By ex post compensation symmetry, we have W (X) =W (Y )
and W (X ′) = W (X ′′). By liberal symmetry, we have W (Y ) = (X ′′). Thus,
W (X) = (X ′).
Finally, we show that f is Schur-concave. Since f is symmetric, it suffices to
show that f is inequality averse. Let X ,X ′ be income distributions such that the
vector (x1·−µ,x2·−µ, . . . ,xc·−µ) is obtained from the vector (x′1·−µ,x′2·−
µ . . . ,x′c·−µ) by a single progressive transfer δ .
Assume the progressive transfer is from an individual (i, j) to (k, j) who is
in the same responsibility group. A progressive transfer between xi j−µ j and
xk j−µ j is equivalent to a progressive transfer between xi j and xk j. Thus, by ex
post Pigou-Dalton compensation, W (X)>W (X ′). Similarly, if the progressive
transfer is from (i, j) to (i,s) who is in the same circumstance group, we have
W (X)>W (X ′) by liberal Pigou-Dalton reward.
Now, assume the progressive transfer is from an individual (i, j) to (k,s).
Let Y and X ′′ be income distributions such that yks = xis and xks = yis with
Y and X coinciding everywhere else, and x′ks = x
′′
is and x
′
ks = x
′′
is with X
′′ and
X ′ coinciding everywhere else. By ex post compensation symmetry, we have
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W (X) =W (Y ) and W (X ′) =W (X ′′). By liberal Pigou-Dalton reward, we have
W (Y )>W (X ′′). Thus, W (X)>W (X ′).
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Suppose that market incomes are additively separable
with summary vector µ in Rr. Let W be a social welfare function that satisfies
all axioms.
By monotonicity, continuity, ex ante aggregation and ex ante compensation
symmetry, there exist a strictly increasing, continuous, symmetric function
fˆ : Rc → R and a strictly increasing, continuous function ˆˆg : Rr → R such that,
for each X in Rc×r, W (X) = fˆ ( ˆˆg(x1·), . . . , ˆˆg(xc·)).
Next, let us define a new function gˆ : Rr → R such that ˆˆg(y) = gˆ(y−µ) for
any vector y in Rr. Note that such a function can be defined since µ is the same
for every vector y. The function gˆ inherits strict increasingness and continuity
from ˆˆg.
Let y,z be two vectors in Rr and λ a real number. By translation invariance,
gˆ(y− µ) ≥ gˆ(z− µ) if and only if gˆ(y+λ1r− µ) ≥ gˆ(z+λ1r− µ). That is,
gˆ is a translatable function. Hence, there exists a strictly increasing function
ψ : R→ R and a unit-translatable function g : Rr → R such that gˆ = ψ ◦ g.
Now let the function f : Rc → R be such that, for each (s1, . . . ,sc) in Rc,
we have fˆ (s1, . . . ,sc) = f (ψ−1(s1), . . . ,ψ−1(sc)). That is, we have fˆ (gˆ(x1·−
µ), . . . , gˆ(xc·−µ)) = f (g(x1·−µ), . . . ,g(xc·−µ)). Hence, W (X) = f (g(x1·−
µ), . . . ,g(xc·− µ)). The function f inherits strict increasingness, continuity
and symmetry from fˆ . It is translatable due to translation invariance and the
fact that g is unit-translatable. The function g inherits strict increasingness and
continuity from gˆ. It is Schur-concave due to liberal Pigou-Dalton reward and
liberal symmetry.
Finally, we show that f is Schur-concave. Let X ,X ′ in Rc×r be such that
the vector (g(x′1· − µ), . . . ,g(x′c· − µ)) is obtained from the vector (g(x1· −
µ), . . . ,g(xc·− µ)) by a single progressive transfer. That is, there exist i,k
in C and a positive real number δ such that g(xi·− µ)− δ = g(x′i·− µ) ≥
g(x′k·− µ) = g(xk·− µ)+ δ with X and X ′ coinciding everywhere else. By
continuity of g, there exist real numbers τ,τ ′ such that g(τ1r−µ) = g(xi·−µ)
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and g(τ ′1r− µ) = g(xk·− µ). Note that τ > τ ′ since g(xi·− µ) > g(x′k·− µ).
Now let T be a c× r matrix in which the ith row is τ1r and the kth row is
τ ′1r with T and X coinciding everywhere else. Let T ′ be a c× r matrix in
which the ith row is (τ − δ )1r and the kth row is (τ ′+ δ )1r with T ′ and X ′
coinciding everywhere else. By ex ante Pigou-Dalton compensation, we have
W (T ′)>W (T ). By construction, we have W (T ′) =W (X ′) and W (T ) =W (X).
We therefore have W (X ′) >W (X). This shows that f is an inequality averse
function. Schur-concavity of f follows from Lemma 4.2 and symmetry of f .
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Suppose that W satisfies all axioms.
Let X and X ′ in Rc×r be such that ∑ j∈R xi j ≥ ∑ j∈R x′i j for each i in C. Let
δi be a real number such that δi =
(
∑ j∈R xi j−∑ j∈R x′i j
)
/r. Let us construct
a new income distribution Y such that yi j = xi j − δi for each (i, j) in C×R.
Note that we have ∑ j∈R yi j = ∑ j∈R x′i j for each i in C. Thus, by utilitarian
reward, we have W (Y ) =W (X ′). By monotonicity, we have W (X) ≥W (Y ).
Thus, we have W (X) ≥W (X ′) with equality holding if every δi = 0, that is,
if ∑ j∈R xi j = ∑ j∈R x′i j. This shows that W (X) ≥W (X ′) whenever ∑ j∈R xi j ≥
∑ j∈R x′i j for each i in C with equality holding if ∑ j∈R xi j = ∑ j∈R x′i j for each
i in C. Thus, there exists a strictly increasing function f : Rc → R such that
W (X) = f (∑ j∈R x1 j, . . . ,∑ j∈R xc j). The function f is continuous by continuity,
translatable by translation invariance and symmetric by ex ante compensation
symmetry.
Next, we show that f is Schur-concave. Let X ,X ′ in Rc×r be such that there
exist i,k in C and a positive real number δ such that (∑ j∈R xi j)−δ =∑ j∈R x′i j ≥
∑ j∈R x′k j = (∑ j∈R xk j)+δ . Let Y and Y
′ in Rc×r be such that, for each (i, j) in
C×R, we have yi j = ∑ j∈R xi j/r and yk j = ∑ j∈R xk j/r and y′i j = ∑ j∈R x′i j/r and
y′k j =∑ j∈R x
′
k j/r. By utilitarian reward, W (Y ) =W (X) and W (Y
′) =W (X ′). By
ex ante Pigou-Dalton compensation, W (Y ′)>W (Y ). Hence, W (X ′)>W (X).
This shows that f is an inequality averse function. Schur-concavity of f follows
from Lemma 4.2 and symmetry of f .
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Proof of Theorem 4.4. Suppose that W satisfies all axioms. By monotonic-
ity, continuity and ex post aggregation there exist a strictly increasing and
continuous function fˆ : Rr → R, and, for each j in R, a strictly increasing
and continuous function gi : Rc → R such that, for each X in Rc×r, we have
W (X) = fˆ (g1(x1·), . . . ,gr(xc·)).
First, we show that g j = gs for all j,s in R. Take y,z in Rc. By continuity of
g j and gs, there exist real numbers δ1,δ2 such that g j(y) = g j(δ11c) and gs(z) =
gs(δ21c). Let Y and Z be income distributions such that y· j = y, y·s = z and
z· j = δ11c, z·s = δ21c with Y and Z coinciding everywhere else. By definition,
we have W (Y ) =W (Z). Next, let Z′ be the income distribution obtained from Z
only by permuting the jth and sth columns of Z. By uniform utilitarian reward,
W (Z) =W (Z′). Hence, W (Z′) =W (Y ). Since this holds for any y and z in Rc
and j,s in R, it follows that we must have gˆ j = gˆs for all j,s in R.
Using the reasoning used in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we can conclude that
there exists a unit-translatable g such that W (X) = f (g(x1·), . . . ,g(xc·)) for each
X in Rc×r.
Next, let X ′ in Rc×r be such that ∑ j∈R g(x· j) ≥ ∑ j∈R g(x′· j). Let Y and
Y ′ in Rc×r be such that, for each j in R, we have g(y· j) = ∑ j∈R g(x· j)/r and
g(y′· j) = ∑ j∈R g(x′· j)/r. By uniform utilitarian reward and unit-translatability
of g, we have W (X) =W (Y ) and W (X ′) =W (Y ′). Moreover, W (Y )≥W (Y ′)
with equality holding if ∑ j∈R g(x· j) = ∑ j∈R g(x′· j) since f is strictly increas-
ing. Thus, we have W (Y ) ≥W (Y ′) if ∑ j∈R g(x· j) ≥ ∑ j∈R g(x′· j) with equality
holding if ∑ j∈R g(x· j) = ∑ j∈R g(x′· j). Thus, there exists a function φ : R→ R
such that W (X) = φ(∑ j∈R g(x· j)). The function g is symmetric due to ex post
compensation symmetry and Schur-concave by symmetry, ex post Pigou-Dalton
compensation and Lemma 4.2.
Proof of Proposition 4.4.
1. Let W : Rc×r → R be a social welfare function that belongs to the class
characterized in Theorem 4.1, and X an income distribution in Rc×r.
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Since f is Schur-concave, for all i,k in C, we must have (x∗i·− µ) =
(x∗k·−µ). That is, we must have x∗i· = (µ1+α(X), . . . ,µr +α(X)) where
α(X) = 1cr (∑i∈C∑ j∈R xi j− c∑i∈R µi).
Now, assume that W is a social welfare function that belongs to the class
characterized in Theorem 4.2, and X is an income distribution in Rc×r.
Since g is Schur-concave, for each i in C and j,s in R, we must have
x∗i j − µ j = x∗is − µs. Moreover, since g is unit-translatable and f is
Schur-concave, we must have (x∗i·−µ) = (x∗k·−µ). That is, x∗i· = (µ1+
α(X), . . . ,µr +α(X)) where α(X) = 1cr (∑i∈C∑ j∈R xi j− c∑i∈R µi).
2. (a) Let W : Rc×r → R be a social welfare function that belongs to the
class characterized in Theorem 4.3. Let X be an income distribution
in Rc×r.
Since f is Schur-concave, for all i,k in C, we have ∑ j∈R x∗i j =
∑ j∈R x∗k j.
(b) Let W : Rc×r → R be a social welfare function that belongs to the
class characterized in Theorem 4.4. Let X be an income distribution
in Rc×r. Let g : Rc → R such that W (X) = f (
r
∑
j=1
g(x· j)). Since g is
Schur-concave, for each j in R, we have x∗k j =
1
c ∑i∈C xi j.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. Take any X in Rc×r. Recall that Xˆ is an income
distribution such that the total income in Xˆ is optimally distributed according to
W and Xˆ has the same welfare as X .
1. Let W be a social welfare function that belongs to the class characterized
in Theorem 4.1 (or 4.2) such that f is unit-translatable and f (0, . . . ,0) = 0.
Let α(X) = (∑i∈C∑ j∈R xi j− c∑i∈R µi)/cr and α(Xˆ) = (∑i∈C∑ j∈R xˆi j−
c∑i∈R µi)/cr.
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We have
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈R
xˆi j = c(∑
j∈R
µ j +α(Xˆ)r)
= c∑
j∈R
µ j +α(Xˆ)cr. (4.5)
Similarly, we have ∑i∈C∑ j∈R xi j = c∑ j∈R µ j +α(X)cr. Thus,
I(X) =
1
cr
(
∑
i∈C
∑
j∈R
xi j−∑
i∈C
∑
j∈R
xˆi j
)
=
1
cr
(
cr(α(X)−α(Xˆ)))
= α(X)−α(Xˆ). (4.6)
By Proposition 4.4, for each i in C, we have x∗i· = µ+α(X)1r. That is,
W (X∗) = f (α(X)1r) = α(X). Similarly, xˆi· = µ+α(Xˆ)1r and W (Xˆ) =
f (α(Xˆ)1r) = α(Xˆ). Moreover, W (X) =W (Xˆ) by construction. That is,
W (X∗)−W (X) = α(X)−α(Xˆ). Thus, I(X) =W (X∗)−W (X).
2. Let W be a social welfare function that belongs to the class character-
ized in Theorem 4.3. Let the function f in (4.3) be unit-translatable with
f (0, . . . ,0)= 0. We have W (X∗)= f (1c ∑i∈C∑ j∈R xi j, . . . ,
1
c ∑i∈C∑ j∈R xi j).
Since f is unit-translatable and f (0, . . . ,0) = 0, W (X∗) = 1c ∑i∈C∑ j∈R xi j.
Similarly, we have W (Xˆ) = 1c ∑i∈C∑ j∈R xˆi j. Combining the two yields
W (X∗)−W (X) = 1c ∑i∈C∑ j∈R xi j− 1c ∑i∈C∑ j∈R xˆi j. Thus, we conclude
I(X) = 1r
(
W (X∗)−W (X)).
Assume next that W is a social welfare function that belongs to the
class characterized in Theorem 4.4 such that f is unit-translatable and
f (0, . . . ,0) = 0 and g(0, . . . ,0) = 0. By Proposition 4.4, we know that
W (X∗) = 1c ∑ j∈R∑i∈C xi j. Thus, I(X) =
1
r
(
W (X∗)−W (X)).
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5FAIR SHARING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RIVER
5.1 Introduction
This paper studies the problem of sharing water from an international river.
The river in question is linear and picks up volume along its course. Water
inflow at the territory of a downstream country cannot be consumed by a country
upstream from it. The aim of this paper is to develop a methodology to evaluate
allocations that consist of a schedule of water consumption and a monetary
compensation scheme. We consider a monetary compensation scheme along
with the water allocation since some upstream countries might be required to let
some of the water within their territory pass to downstream countries in order to
reach an efficient consumption plan. Monetary compensations are needed to
convince upstream countries to give up water.
Sharing river water has often been a source of conflict between riparian
countries mostly due to lack of well-defined property rights over rivers (Kilgour
and Dinar, 1995). Several principles of international law based on different
conceptions of property rights have been proposed to resolve such conflicts. This
paper focuses on three of those principles. The principle of absolute territorial
sovereignty (ATS) states that a country has absolute sovereignty over the part of
the river that is within its borders. Unlimited territorial integrity (UTI) states
that one country cannot alter the quantity or quality of water available to another.
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The territorial integration of all basin states (TIBS) considers the entire river a
single unit, and allows each country an unlimited use of it.1
Even though these principles are intuitive, they are difficult to formulate in
applications. Moreover, allocations proposed by UTI and TIBS are not feasible
due to the one directionality of the water flow. This paper first proposes a way
to formalize the principles. To do so, we take a reference vector r that defines
the property rights over the river. That is, ri shows the amount of river water i
has a right to consume without having to compensate any other country. Our
main axiom, Pigou-Dalton for r, says that, given that each country consumes
its reference level of water, equalizing monetary compensations received by
countries is an improvement. This axiom is based on the idea that property rights
remove the need for compensations. In Section 5.3, we argue that the axiom
provides a reasonable way to formalize ATS, UTI and TIBS via the choice
of the reference vector. We present a theorem which shows that anonymity
and Pigou-Dalton for r imply that TIBS must be chosen over ATS and UTI
(Theorem 5.1).
Next, we show that a ranking that satisfies Pigou-Dalton for r, Pareto,
anonymity and an independence axiom applies the Lorenz dominance criterion
to equivalent income vectors. The equivalent income of a country is the amount
of the hypothetical monetary compensation that, if combined with the reference
level of water consumption, would give the country the same utility as its initial
situation. The Hammond equity version of Pigou-Dalton for r combined with
weak Pareto, on the other hand, characterizes the class of egalitarian equivalent
orderings that apply the maximin criterion to vectors of equivalent income.
The practice of using reference vectors in the construction of (social) order-
ings can be found in the literature on fair allocations, but has not been utilized
by the literature on river sharing. The contribution of this paper is in showing
that the idea of a reference vector can be very fruitful when applied to the issue
of river sharing. Moreover, we contribute to the debate on which principle of
international law to use in practice by recommending TIBS over the other two.
1See Kilgour and Dinar (1995) for a more comprehensive list of such principles.
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5.2. PRELIMINARIES
Most of the recent axiomatic studies (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002; Béal
et al., 2012; Van den Brink et al., 2012) model the problem as a cooperative
game where axioms are imposed on the distribution of welfare to the countries.
Van den Brink et al. (2013) argue that the axioms should be imposed directly
on the allocation of welfare derived from water use since this allows a close
link between the axioms and actual water allocation. Ansink and Weikard
(2013) take the argument one step further and impose axioms directly on the
allocation of water without using tools of cooperative game theory. This paper
also imposes axioms directly on allocations of water without using a coalitions
approach. However, unlike Van den Brink et al. (2013) and Ansink and Weikard
(2013), we use orderings instead of allocation rules. This approach provides a
tool for addressing issues of second-best allocation (see the conclusion).
5.2 Preliminaries
A group of n countries collected in a set N are located along a linear river.
We name the countries based on their location: Country 1 is the source country,
Country 2 is the one downstream from 1 and so on. The river flows in one
direction only. It picks up volume along its course starting with e1 at the
beginning of 1’s position, followed by e2 at the beginning of 2’s position and so
on. Each ei is positive.
Each country i has a benefit function bi : R+→ R that represents the ben-
efits i derives from the consumption of water. Each bi is strictly increasing
(that is, each country is non-satiable) and strictly concave.2 The set of all
admissible benefit functions is B. A profile of benefit functions is denoted by
b = (b1, . . . ,bn).
The amount of water consumed by i is denoted by wi and the net monetary
compensation i receives is denoted by ti. The utility of i at (wi, ti) is given by
2It is not restrictive to assume non-satiable agents. Assume bi is not strictly increasing and
it has a satiation point yi. If ei > yi, then we can redefine ei+1 = ei+1+ ei− yi. So the problem
can be rewritten as e′i = yi and e′i+1 = ei+1+ ei− yi and so forth.
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ui(wi, ti) = bi(wi)+ ti. Hence, it is possible to use monetary compensations to
convince countries to agree on a certain allocation of water use.
An allocation a is a pair (w, t) = (w1, . . . ,wn; t1, . . . , tn). The set of all al-
locations is A = Rn+×Rn. We use a complete and transitive ranking R on A
to evaluate allocations in terms of fairness and goodness. For every profile of
benefit functions b in Bn, R determines an ordering R(b) over A. The strict and
indifference counterparts are denoted by P and I. Throughout the paper, we
use aRa′ instead of aR(b)a′ when this raises no confusion. Note that we do
not restrict the domain of R to the set of feasible allocations. This is because
unlimited territorial integrity (UTI) and territorial integration of all basin states
(TIBS) propose unfeasible allocations as the optimal, and our solution for the
unfeasibility problem requires the ranking R to work on the full domain.
Our first axiom is Pareto. Pareto requires R to be indifferent between two
allocations a and a′ if each country is indifferent between them. Moreover, if
at least one country strictly prefers a to a′ with no other country that strictly
prefers a′ to a, then Pareto demands that the first be strictly preferred by R.
Pareto. For each profile of benefit functions b in Bn and all allocations (w, t)
and (w′, t ′) in A, if ui(wi, ti) = ui(w′i, t ′i) for each i in N, then aI(b)a′. Moreover,
if ui(wi, ti)≥ ui(w′i, t ′i) for each i in N and u j(w j, t j)> u j(w′j, t ′j) for some j in
N, then aP(b)a′.
Next, we define anonymity. Anonymity says that, if each country has the
same benefit function, R must be indifferent between two allocations if one is
obtained from the other by a permutation of the bundles of countries. Given an
allocation a in A and a permutation ρ on N, the permuted allocation is denoted
by aρ = (wρ , tρ) = (wρ(1), . . . ,wρ(n); tρ(1), . . . , tρ(n)).
Anonymity. For each allocation a in A, each permutation ρ on N and each
profile of benefit functions b in Bn such that each country i has the same benefit
function, we have aI(b)aρ .
Note that anonymity says that names and locations of the countries do not
matter. It is therefore different from the anonymity axioms which require only
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the names not to matter. Moreover, it is restricted to a limited number of cases,
i.e., it only applies if every country has the same benefit function. This version
of the axiom is plausible in our context since the location, and hence the inflow
of a country, is determined mostly by historical events and nature. Thus, a fair
ranking should not take those into account in social judgments.
5.3 Formalization of the principles
The lack of well-defined property rights over an international river leads to
international water disputes. Several principles of international law have been
proposed to prevent and solve such conflicts. However, they are often difficult to
formalize and apply. We argue that Pigou-Dalton for r defined below provides
a reasonable formalization of absolute territorial sovereignty (ATS), unlimited
territorial integrity (UTI) and territorial integration of all basin states (TIBS).
Let the vector r = (r1, . . . ,rn) in Rn+ be the reference vector that defines
property rights over the river. That is, ri is the amount of river water that country
i has a right to consume. Pigou-Dalton for r says that a transfer of money from a
richer country to a poorer one such that the one that starts out with less monetary
compensation does not end up with more than the other is an improvement at
allocations where each country already consumes their reference level.
Pigou-Dalton for r. For each profile of benefit functions b in Bn, all allocations
(r, t) and (r, t ′) in A, if there exist two countries i and j such that ti ≥ t j and
a positive real number δ such that t ′i = ti + δ and t ′j = t j − δ with t and t ′
coinciding everywhere else, then (r, t)P(b)(r, t ′).
Pigou-Dalton for r is based on the idea that a country that consumes the
amount of water they are entitled to does not need to compensate another.
Recall that ATS considers a country entitled to the part of the river within
its borders. Thus, setting each ri equal to ei in the definition of Pigou-Dalton
for r provides a formalization of the principle. The principle clearly favours
countries with a higher inflow.
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The second principle, UTI, on the other hand, can be interpreted as con-
sidering each country entitled to the welfare level they would achieve if they
could consume all the water available up to their position.3 Setting each ri equal
to ∑ j≤i e j provides a reasonable formalization of the principle. The principle
clearly favours downstream countries.
Finally, recall that TIBS considers each riparian country entitled to a reason-
able and equitable share in the river water. One can thus interpret the principle as
sharing the total flow in the river equally among countries (Van den Brink et al.,
2012). Setting each ri equal to ∑i∈N ei/n provides a reasonable formalization
of the principle. We can also set ri equal to ∑i∈N ei since it considers the entire
river as a single unit and states that all countries are allowed an unlimited use of
it (Soffer et al., 1999).
An important difference between TIBS and the other two principles is
that the former sets the same reference level for all countries. The following
theorem shows that this makes the principle the only principle among the three
compatible with Pareto and anonymity.4
Theorem 5.1. A ranking R on A satisfies Pareto, anonymity and Pigou-Dalton
for r only if ri = r j for all countries i and j in N.
Pareto is a standard axiom of efficiency. The interpretation of the impossi-
bility result of Theorem 5.1 depends on whether one considers the other two
desirable. We consider Pigou-Dalton for r to be desirable since it provides a
reasonable formalization of the principles. Anonymity, on the other hand, is a
fairness axiom which guarantees that irrelevant characteristics do not matter.
Thus, we argue that Theorem 5.1 suggests that TIBS should be chosen over the
other two principles.
In light of Theorem 5.1, in the sequel, we assume that each country has the
same reference level. We nevertheless use the same notation, r, to denote this
reference vector as this raises no confusion.
3This is also the interpretation of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) and Ambec and Ehlers
(2008).
4Assuming the same reference level for each country, a ranking that satisfies all axioms in
Theorem 5.1 is the generalized Lorenz preorder defined in the next section.
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5.4 Two proposals to rank allocations
5.4.1 Generalized Lorenz preorder
Given the assumption that the reference level is the same for all countries,
we suggest that in comparisons of allocations a and a′ where every country
is given their reference level, the social ranking must be independent of the
benefit function profile. Indeed, in these cases, each country i’s ranking of ai
and a′i is independent of bi, so why would the social ranking depend on those?
Independence captures this idea.
Independence. For each profile of benefit functions b and b′ in Bn and all alloca-
tions (r, t) and (r, t ′) in A, we have (r, t)R(b)(r, t ′) if and only if (r, t)R(b′)(r, t ′).
Theorem 5.2 below shows that a ranking that satisfies Pareto, anonymity,
independence and Pigou-Dalton for r must be inequality averse with respect to
equivalent incomes of individual countries. The equivalent income of a country
i at an allocation a is the amount of the hypothetical monetary compensation
that, if combined with the reference level of water consumption, would give
the country the same utility i has at a.5 That is, given an allocation a = (w, t)
in A, for each i in N, the equivalent income of i, denoted by di(a), is such
that bi(wi)+ ti = bi(ri)+di(a). Note that di represents country i’s preferences.
Figure 5.1 shows the calculation of equivalent incomes.
Now, set d(a) = (d1(a), . . . ,dn(a)). Let d[.](a) be a rearrangement of the
elements of d(a) that reorders elements of d(a) in a non-decreasing way. That
is, d[1](a) ≤ d[2](a) ≤ . . . ≤ d[n](a). The generalized Lorenz preorder with
reference r, denoted RrL, is such that, for each b in B
n and all allocations a and
a′ in A,
aRrL(b)a
′⇐⇒
k
∑
i=1
d[i](a)≥
k
∑
i=1
d[i](a
′) for each k in {1, . . . ,n}. (5.1)
5For uses and discussions of the concept of equivalent income, see Pazner and Schmeidler
(1978) in the context of fair allocations, Willig (1981) in the context of ranking income
distributions, Moulin (1987) in sharing the cost of a public good and Fleurbaey et al. (2013) and
references therein for an application to health.
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w
t
ri
(wi, ti)
di(a)
Figure 5.1 Calculation of dis. The intersection of i’s indifference curve at (wi, ti)
with the line w = ri is di(a).
Given d(a) and d(a′), the generalized Lorenz preorder prefers the more
equally distributed one. For instance, for n = 3 and a and a′ such that d(a) =
(1,15,8), d(a′) = (4,15,5), we have a′RrL a since a′ is obtained from a via a
transfer of 3 units from country 3 to country 1, making the distribution more
equal.
Theorem 5.2 shows that any ranking that satisfies Pareto, anonymity, inde-
pendence and Pigou-Dalton for r respects the generalized Lorenz preorder.6
Theorem 5.2. If a ranking R on A satisfies Pareto, anonymity, independence
and Pigou-Dalton for r, then aRrL(b)a
′ implies aR(b)a′ and aPrL(b)a′ implies
aP(b)a′ for each profile of benefit functions b in Bn.
5.4.2 Egalitarian equivalent ordering
In this section, we first define weak Pareto and a stronger version of Pigou-
Dalton for r.7
6It has been shown before that axioms recommending Pigou-Dalton transfers combined
with anonymity and Pareto lead to characterizations of Lorenz preorders. Willig (1981) is the
first to use reference vectors and prove a similar result in an income distribution context where
the household endowments and prices are given.
7Recall that the reference level is assumed to be the same for each country.
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Weak Pareto. For each profile of benefit functions b in Bn and all allocations a
and a′ in A, if ui(wi, ti)> ui(w′i, t ′i) for each country i in N, then aP(b)a′.
Hammond equity for r. For each profile of benefit functions b in Bn, all
allocations (r, t) and (r, t ′) in A, if there exist two countries i and j such that
t ′i ≥ ti ≥ t j ≥ t ′j with the first or third inequality strict and with (r, t) and (r, t ′)
coinciding everywhere else, then (r, t)R(b)(r, t ′).
The egalitarian equivalent ordering with reference r, denoted by RrE is such
that for each b in Bn and all allocations a and a′ in A,
aRrE(b)a
′⇔ d[1](a)≥ d[1](a′).
The ordering RrE also favors more equal distributions of dis. The main
difference between the two relations is that RrE only focuses on the minimum of
d(a) and is not concerned with what happens in other parts of the distribution.
In the example above, RrE also prefers a
′ to a.
Theorem 5.3 below shows that any ranking that satisfies weak Pareto and
Hammond equity for r is either the egalitarian equivalent ordering or a refine-
ment of it.8
Theorem 5.3. If a ranking R on A satisfies weak Pareto and Hammond equity
for r, then aPrE(b)a
′ implies aP(b)a′ for each profile of benefit functions b in
Bn.
5.5 Conclusion
Most of the recent axiomatic studies on river sharing model the problem as
a cooperative game, where axioms are imposed on the distribution of welfare
to the countries and solution concepts (i.e., allocation rules) are proposed.
This paper does not use a cooperative game theory approach since this is not
8It has been shown before that Pigou-Dalton axioms replaced with the stronger Hammond
equity axioms and combined with weak Pareto lead to characterizations of the egalitarian
equivalent ordering in various contexts (Bosmans and Ooghe (2013); Fleurbaey and Maniquet,
2011; Miyagishima et al., 2014; Tungodden, 2000).
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necessary to propose rankings. Nevertheless, allocation rules can be derived
from the rankings characterized here simply by taking the optimal allocation
chosen by each ranking.
Additionally, using a ranking approach makes our analysis applicable to
second best problems. For instance, in situations where the core of the coopera-
tive game9 induced by the river sharing problem is not a singleton, the rankings
proposed here can be used to choose from the set of core allocations, hence
enabling us to design acceptable and relatively fair allocations. This becomes
especially important in cases of international rivers where we need to design
allocations acceptable to all countries in order to achieve practical solutions.
9For a cooperative game derived from the river sharing problem, see Ambec and Sprumont
(2002).
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Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let R satisfy the axioms and r be the reference vector.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that there exist k,m in N such that rk < rm.
Let b in Bn be such that bi = b j for all countries i, j in N . Let ρ be
the permutation on N such that ρ(k) = m, ρ(m) = k and ρ(i) = i for each
i ̸= k,m. Consider the following three allocations (also shown in the table
below): a = (r1, . . . ,rn, t1n), aρ , and a′ = (r1, . . . ,rn, t, . . . , t ′k, t
′
m, . . . , t) where
t ′k, t
′
m are such that b(rm)+ t = b(rk)+ t
′
k and b(rk)+ t = b(rm)+ t
′
m.
(wk, tk) (wm, tm) (wi, ti) for i ̸= k,m
a (rk, t) (rm, t) (ri, t)
aρ (rm, t) (rk, t) (ri, t)
a′ (rk, t ′k) (rm, t
′
m) (ri, t)
Note that each country is indifferent between their bundle at a and aρ . Thus,
aρ I(b)a′ by Pareto.
Since rk < rm and b is strictly increasing, we must have t ′m < t < t ′k. More-
over, by construction t ′k + t
′
m = 2t. Thus, we have aP(b)a
′ by Pigou-Dalton for
r. Finally, by anonymity, we have aI(b)aρ , a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Let R satisfy the axioms. Let b in Bn be a profile of
benefit functions and a = (w, t) and a′ = (w′, t ′) allocations such that aRrL(b)a′.
We will show that aR(b)a′.
First, let b¯ in Bn be a profile where each country has the same benefit
function. Let ad = (r,d(a)) and a′d = (r,d(a
′)) be such that d1(a)≤ . . .≤ dn(a)
and d1(a′)≤ . . .≤ dn(a′). Note that this can be done without loss of generality
due to anonymity and the fact that ri = r j for all i, j in N.
Next, let aˆ = (r, tˆ) be an allocation such that tˆi = di(a′d) for each i ∈
{1, . . . ,n− 1} and tˆn = dn(a′d) +∑i∈N di(ad)−∑i∈N di(a′d).10 Note that we
have ∑i∈N di(ad) = ∑i∈N tˆi by construction.
The following are true.
10This formulation is inspired by Shorrocks (1983, Theorem 2).
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1. By construction, ∑i∈N di(ad) = ∑i∈N tˆi. Moreover, aRrL(b)a′ implies
ad RrL(b¯) aˆ. That is, we have either di(ad) = tˆi for each i in N or that
d(ad) can be obtained from tˆ by a finite sequence of Pigou-Dalton trans-
fers. Thus, by reflexivity and Pigou-Dalton for r, we have ad R(b¯) aˆ:
2. By construction, we have tˆ ≥ d(a′d) with strict inequality holding if
∑i∈N di(ad)> ∑i∈N di(a′d). Thus, by Pareto, we have aˆR(b¯)a
′
d .
So, we have ad R(b¯) aˆR(b¯)a′d . Thus, by transitivity, ad R(b¯)a
′
d . By inde-
pendence, ad R(b¯)a′d implies ad R(b)a
′
d . By Pareto, ad I(b)a and a
′
d I(b)a
′. We
therefore obtain aR(b)a′ by transitivity.
Now, assume aPrL(b)a
′. This means ad PrL(b¯)a′d by definition. That is,
∑ki=1 di(ad)≥∑ki=1 di(a′d) for each k in {1, . . . ,n} with some m in {1, . . . ,n} for
which the inequality is strict. Let m also denote the minimum m such that this
inequality holds strictly.
If∑i∈N di(ad)=∑i∈N di(a′d), then we can conclude that d(ad) can be reached
from d(a′d) by a finite sequence of Pigou-Dalton transfers since we know that
d(ad) ̸= d(a′d). Thus, ad P(b¯)a′d by Pareto and Pigou-Dalton for r (and transi-
tivity if necessary).
If ∑i∈N di(ad) > ∑i∈N di(a′d) and di(ad) ≥ di(a′d) for each i ∈ {m+ 1,m+
2, . . . ,n}, then ad P(b¯)a′d follows from Pareto.
Now, assume ∑i∈N di(ad)>∑i∈N di(a′d). Assume also that the set N1 = {i∈
N : di(a′d)> di(ad)} is non-empty. Let N2 = {i ∈N : di(ad)≥ di(a′d)}. The fact
that ad PrL(b¯)a
′
d yields,
∑
i∈N2
(di(ad)−di(a′d))> ∑
i∈N1
(di(a′d)−di(ad)). (5.2)
Let a˜ = (r, t˜) be an allocation such that t˜i = di(ad) for each i in N2 and
∑i∈N1(di(a
′
d)− di(ad)) is allocated, via Pigou-Dalton transfers, to agents in
N1 in a way such that di(ad) ≥ t˜i for each i in N1. Note that equation (5.2)
guarantees that this can be done.
We therefore have a˜P(b¯)a′d by Pigou-Dalton for r. By Pareto, ad P(b¯) a˜.
Thus, by transitivity ad P(b¯)a′d .
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Applying independence and Pareto as above, we obtain aP(b)a′.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Let R satisfy the axioms. Let b be a profile of benefit
functions and a = (w, t),a′ = (w′, t ′) allocations in A such that aPrE(b)a′. It
suffices to show that aP(b)a′.
Let δ = (d[1](a)− d[1](a′))/10n. Let aˆ, aˆ′ be allocations such that aˆ =
(r,d(a)− δ1n) and aˆ′ = (r,d(aˆ′)+ δ1n) in A. By weak Pareto, aP(b) aˆ and
aˆ′P(b)a′.
Next, we show that aˆP(b) aˆ′. First note that d[1](aˆ)> d[1](aˆ′). Let a˜ = (r, t˜)
be such that d[1](aˆ′) ≤ t˜[1] ≤ t˜[2] ≤ . . . ≤ t˜[n] < d[2](aˆ′) and t˜[n] < d[1](aˆ). By
weak Pareto, aˆP(b) a˜. By Hammond equity for r, a˜R(b) aˆ′. Thus, we have
aP(b) aˆP(b) a˜R(b) aˆ′P(b)a′. That is, aP(b)a′.
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De vier hoofdstukken van deze dissertatie hebben betrekking op rechtvaardig-
heidsprincipes in een verscheidenheid van economische omstandigheden. In
elk hoofdstuk is het hoofddoel rangschikkingen van sociale welvaartsfuncties
te bepalen voor de evaluatie van distributies in termen van rechtvaardigheid en
efficiëntie.
Rechtvaardigheid is een lastig concept. Wanneer men een eerlijke verdeling
wil definiëren, moet men zich eerst afvragen wat de relevante uitkomstvariabele
is (inkomen, welzijn, etc.) en wie de ontvangers van die uitkomstvariabele
zijn. Hierna komen we bij een van de meest belangrijke vragen die we ons
moeten stellen bij het definiëren van een eerlijke verdeling: “Welke individu-
ele karakteristieken zijn ethisch relevant?”. Met andere woorden, men moet
zich afvragen welke persoonlijke karakteristieken ongelijkheid (bijvoorbeeld
inkomensongelijkheid) tussen twee individuen kan rechtvaardigen. Wat ethisch
relevant is hangt af van de specificaties van een situatie. Bijvoorbeeld, het
aantal gewerkte uren kan als relevant worden beschouwd wanneer men een
inkomensverdeling bestudeert, maar het aantal gewerkte uren zal waarschijnlijk
niet relevant zijn in de context van stoelreserveringen in een bioscoop.
In hoofdstuk 2 is de uitkomst die we bestuderen een verzameling van m
goederen, en de ontvangers zijn individuen. We karakteriseren rechtvaardigheid
als afgunstvrijheid. Een allocatie is afgunstvrij als geen enkel individu de
toebedeling van een ander prefereert boven zijn eigen toebedeling. Het criterium
beschouwt voorkeuren als ethisch relevant.
Ook al is afgunstvrijheid een van de belangrijkste concepten in de literatuur
betreffende verdelende rechtvaardigheid, het concept lost niet alle verdelingspro-
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blemen op. Dit is omdat de verzameling van afgunstvrije en efficiënte allocaties
erg groot kan worden en zelfs leeg kan zijn. Voorgaande is het tweede onder-
werp in hoofdstuk 2. We stellen een klasse van afgunstmaatstaven voor om
allocaties te vergelijken. De klasse meet totale afgunst door het sommeren van
individuele afgunst.
In hoofdstuk 3 bestuderen we inkomen waar de ontvangers een groep van
n individuen zijn. Het basisprincipe van verdelende rechtvaardigheid in dit
hoofdstuk is libertarisme. We definiëren een axioma, laissez-faire, om de
bezwaren tegen herverdeling vanuit de hoek van libertarisme vast te leggen. Het
axioma stelt dat de verdeling waarin elk individu zijn marktinkomen ontvangt
beter is dan elke andere allocatie van dezelfde hoeveelheid van totaal inkomen.
Om deze reden is libertarisme een criterium van verdelende rechtvaardigheid
die marktinkomen beschouwt als de ethisch significante karakteristiek.
Twee justificaties voor libertarisme zijn individuele vrijheid en de efficiënte
van de vrije markt. Dit hoofdstuk refereert naar de tweede justificatie. We tonen
aan dat we nog steeds problemen tegenkomen in het bereiken van efficiënte
zelfs als herverdeling compleet uitgesloten is.
In hoofdstuk 4 bestuderen we als relevante variabele inkomen, en de ont-
vangers verschillen met betrekking tot ethisch relevante karakteristieken (deze
karakteristieken noemen we “verantwoordelijkheidskarakteristieken”) en irre-
levante karakteristieken (zogenaamde “omstandigheden”). Het concept van
rechtvaardigheid is gelijkheid van kansen.
Gelijkheid van kansen bestaat uit twee hoofdprincipes. De eerste, het
compensatieprincipe, stelt dat ongelijkheid vanwege omstandigheidsverschillen
onrechtvaardig is. De tweede, het beloningsprincipe, geeft antwoord op de
vraag hoe inkomen te verdelen tussen individuen welke alleen verschillen
gebaseerd op hun “verantwoordelijkheidskarakteristieken”. We focussen op
twee interpretaties van het beloningsidee. De eerste interpretatie, “liberale
beloning”, stelt dat verschillen in marktinkomen tussen individuen moet worden
gehandhaafd wanneer men inkomen tussen individuen verdeelt die dezelfde
omstandigheden delen. De tweede interpretatie, “utilitaristische beloning”, stelt
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dat rechtvaardigheid niet afhangt van de manier waarop inkomen wordt verdeeld
tussen individuen.
In hoofdstuk 4, presenteren we welvaartsfuncties die “compensatie” en
“liberale beloning” combineren, alsmede “compensatie” en “utilitaristische
beloning”. We presenteren ook de optimale verdelingen die gesuggereerd
worden door deze welvaartsfuncties. In het tweede deel van het hoofdstuk,
presenteren we ongelijkheidsmaten die ongelijkheid van kansen meten als het
verschil tussen de eigenlijke verdeling en de eerlijke verdeling.
In hoofdstuk 5 bestuderen we internationale rivieren, en de ontvangers zijn
soevereine staten die grenzen aan de rivier. Het delen van water uit internatio-
nale rivieren is vaak een bron van conflict tussen landen, voornamelijk doordat
eigendomsrechten betreffende rivieren niet duidelijk bepaald zijn. Meerdere
internationale principes van internationaal recht zijn voorgesteld om dit pro-
bleem op te lossen. Wij focussen op drie principes die de meeste aandacht van
beleidsmakers en onderzoekers hebben gekregen. Ten eerste, het principe van
absolute territoriale soevereiniteit (ATS), stelt dat een land absolute soevereini-
teit heeft over het deel van een rivier binnen zijn grenzen. Met andere woorden,
het principe stelt dat grenzen ethisch relevant zijn. Ten tweede, ongelimiteerde
territoriale integriteit (UTI), stelt dat een land niet de kwantiteit en kwaliteit van
water dat vloeit naar een ander land kan aanpassen. Het principe beschouwt de
hoeveelheid water beschikbaar tot de grenzen van een land als ethisch relevant.
Ten derde, territoriale integratie van alle landen grenzend aan een rivier (TIBS),
stelt dat de hele rivier als een gehele entiteit beschouwd dient te worden en dat
landen er een ongelimiteerd gebruik van mogen maken. Met andere woorden,
alle landen zijn gelijk in termen van relevante karakteristieken.
Ook al zijn deze principes intuïtief, ze zijn desalniettemin lastig te formu-
leren in concrete toepassingen. Bovendien is er een voortdurend debat welke
principes te gebruiken in praktische toepassingen. Deze twee vragen zijn het
onderwerp van hoofdstuk 5. We stellen als eerste een manier voor om deze
principe te formaliseren. We beargumenteren dan dat TIBS de voorkeur geniet
boven ATS en UTI.
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Territoriale integriteit van alle landen grenzend aan een rivier als primair
criterium nemend van verdelende rechtvaardigheid, stellen we twee rankings
voor om allocaties van rivier water te vergelijken.
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What, why and to whom?
The current dissertation provides insights on criteria of distributive justice
in a variety of economic environments. Distributive justice concerns the fair dis-
tribution of resources, including but not limited to income, goods and services,
wealth, education, health care and opportunities. The four main chapters of this
dissertation focus on the distribution of a group of commodities, the distribu-
tion of income, the distribution of opportunities for income in a society, and
the distribution of water from an international river among riparian countries,
respectively.
The relevance of this dissertation is therefore best explained by focusing on
the social and economic relevance of the results presented in individual chapters.
The second chapter, “An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy”,
provides a class of functions to measure envy in a society. As noted in the
introduction and concluding remarks of the chapter, the envy measures proposed
in the chapter can be used as multidimensional inequality measures in the
(realistic) case of individuals who have possibly different preferences over the
bundle of goods in question.
Naturally, there exists a wide variety of inequality measures that are based
on different philosophical ideas, and that are designed to be used in different
contexts. The literature is far too wide to provide a review here, yet suffice it
to say, for our purposes here, that we can roughly divide inequality measures
into two groups: unidimensional inequality measures and multidimensional
inequality measures. The former are measures that focus on distributions of
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only one commodity such as income. However, there are many situations in
which there are several dimensions to inequality and these dimensions cannot be
reduced to a single index in a meaningful manner. For example, public authori-
ties may be interested in the distributions of housing, health, education, food,
etc. in the population and not so much with the distribution of income per se.
Another case of interest is the case where the government is concerned both with
income and with non-monetary variables. In such situations, unidimensional
inequality measures prove inadequate to compare inequality within and between
populations. The acknowledgement of this fact has lead to a wide literature on
multidimensional inequality measurement beginning with the seminal articles
by Kolm (1977) and Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982).11 And, as noted above,
it is that literature that this chapter belongs to.
At this point, it is important to note the relevance of inequality measurement.
Inequality is important for both normative and practical reasons. Social justice
is central in considerations of inequality in a society. “That more just societies
should register lower numbers on the inequality scale evidently accords with
an intuitive appreciation of the term inequality” (Cowell, 2011, p. 11). Justice
arguments are often made in connection with all dimensions of social life such as
income, wealth, political power, taxation, labor markets, education, health care
and military service. For instance, in considering a particular policy proposal –
say for reducing the amount given in student grants – the inequality implication
of the policy (that is whether the policy leads to more or less inequality) is often
taken to be an argument for or against the policy. A primary motivation for
inequality measurement is therefore to guide policy. However, we need to be
able to measure inequality in order to be able to assess inequality implications
of policies. Thus, as noted by Kaplow (2005), measuring inequality seems
appropriate as an input to policymaking. As such, the results of this chapter are
of interest to policymakers as well as empirical researchers.
The third chapter, “Laissez-faire versus Pareto”, contributes to discussions
of libertarianism by showing the difficulty of combining libertarianism with
11See Savaglio (2002) for a survey.
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Pareto efficiency. As such, the academic community is the target audience of
this chapter.
The fourth chapter, “Measurement of equality of opportunity: a norma-
tive approach”, proposes social welfare functions and inequality measures to
compare income distributions in terms of equality of opportunity. Equality of
opportunity measures distinguish between inequalities arising from the exercise
of individual responsibility and inequalities due to predetermined circumstances.
The theory of equality of opportunity differs from the classical theories of
distributive justice in that perfect equality where each individual is given the
same outcome (e.g., the same income for everyone) is not promoted as the
ideal. Instead, a central role for personal responsibility is incorporated into the
definition of distributive justice. It is argued that the outcome (e.g., income) of
an individual is determined by his circumstances, which are characteristics that
cannot be attributed to individual responsibility (e.g., gender), and responsibility
characteristics which the individual can be held accountable for (e.g., effort).
Inequalities due to circumstances (e.g., wage difference due to gender) are
considered unacceptable, while inequalities due to responsibility characteristics
(e.g., wage difference due to a difference in the number of hours worked) may
be acceptable.
Such a distinction between equality of opportunity as an ideal and equality
of outcomes as an ideal is of interest to economists for at least four reasons.
First, a society in which people are not discriminated against on the basis of race,
ethnicity, religion, sex and sexual orientation is widely upheld as desirable in it-
self Arneson (2015). Second, we know from social and political debate, surveys
Schokkaert and Devooght (2003) and economic experiments Cappelen et al.
(2007) that most people have a conception of fairness similar to that adopted
by the theory of equality of opportunity. That is, they consider some inequality
of outcomes fair. Third, there is evidence showing that there may be a link
between perceptions of fairness and individual attitudes towards redistribution
which in turn affect actual levels of redistribution, and hence investment and
output generated (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006).
Finally, as argued by The World Bank (2005), equality of opportunity can be
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instrumental for economic growth. Thus, equality of opportunity has normative
and practical significance. And as in the case of inequality measurement, the
primary motivation for the measurement of equality of opportunity is to guide
policy. As also in the case of inequality measurement, we must first be able to
measure equality of opportunity in order to make empirical use of the concept.
As such, the measures provided in this chapter are of interest to policymakers
as well as empirical researchers.
The fifth chapter, “Fair sharing of an international river”, contributes to
the debate on sharing water from international rivers. Proposed here is a
methodology to compare international river water allocations in terms of fairness
and efficiency.
Water resources are called international if they are shared by several coun-
tries. Examples include rivers and lakes that border two or more countries and
rivers that flow from one country into another. In all these cases, one country’s
use of the shared water resource affects the quantity or quality available to
another country (Barrett, 1994).
The problem of river water sharing is of considerable practical importance
given the fact that148 rivers in the world flow through two countries, 30 through
three, 9 through four, and 13 through five or more (Barrett, 1994).
Sharing water from international rivers has often been a source of conflict
between riparian countries mostly because property rights over rivers are not
well defined. Examples of disputes listed by Kilgour and Dinar (1995, p. 1)
include the proposal for out-of-basin diversion of the Mekong River (Thailand
and Laos); the operation of the Farraka Barrage diversion of the Ganges (India
and Bangladesh); the proposed desalination plant near Morales Dam on the
Colorado River (Mexico and U.S.A.); and the dispute over the 1959 Nile water
agreement (Egypt, Sudan, and now Ethiopia). Several international principles of
international law were proposed to solve this problem. We focus on three prin-
ciples that attracted most attention from policymakers and researchers: absolute
territorial sovereignty, unlimited territorial integrity and territorial integration of
all basin states. Even though these principles are intuitive, they are difficult to
formulate in applications. Moreover, there is an ongoing debate on which one
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to use in practical applications. It is these two questions that this chapter tackles.
First, we propose a way to formalize the principles. Second, we argue that
territorial integration of all basin states must be chosen over absolute territorial
sovereignty and unlimited territorial integrity. Taking territorial integration
of all basin states as the primary criterion of distributive justice, we propose
a ranking that could be used to assess distributions of water among riparian
countries. Furthermore, the ranking proposed in the chapter can easily be used
to propose an implementable scheme for the allocation of water from a given
river. The target audience of this chapter, in addition to the scientific community,
is therefore, again, policymakers.
Future directions
All chapters of this dissertation are prepared for publication in international
academic journals. In this section, we briefly discuss theoretical and applied
research that the chapters of this thesis can lead to.
For each chapter, the context within which the model is defined can be
changed into more realistic (and hence, complicated) contexts. For instance, in
case of chapter two, a possible extension would be to propose envy measures
in a production model where individuals possess unequal productive skills in
addition to unequal preferences. Or one can modify our measures so as to
compare envy in societies with different population sizes, which is a particularly
necessary practice if one wishes to compare inequality levels between two
countries. With regard to applications, one needs information on individual
preferences in order to use our envy measures in applications. These could be
derived from surveys. Once one has information on preferences, our measures
are very easy to apply since they require the use of simple functions applied to
pairwise comparisons of individual bundles.
In case of chapter four, a natural first extension of this paper would be
to study the empirical applications of our measures. The classes of welfare
functions and inequality measures presented in the chapter are large in the sense
that many possibilities are available for use in empirical research. For instance,
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one could apply our measures to see to what extent the tax system in a country,
or a region, equalizes opportunities for income acquisition. Some examples
of questions to ask are “Does socio-economic status of one’s parents affect
one’s chances in life?”, “How about gender, race, sexual orientation?” or, on a
more international level, “How should international aid be distributed based on
country characteristics?” Our measures are readily applicable to such questions.
A particular advantage our measures possess is that they allow for different
ideological positions as to how exercise of responsibility is rewarded.
Chapter four considers comparisons of income distributions with a fixed set
of circumstance and responsibility characteristics. A second natural extension
would be to develop measures for comparisons of income distributions with
different profiles of individual characteristics.
A third possible extension would be to focus on multidimensional inequal-
ity of opportunity. As discussed above, there are good reasons to do so. For
instance, in the question of distributing international aid, international organisa-
tions might be willing to provide in-kind transfers such as medication, medical
equipments and housing along with monetary transfers. One needs multidimen-
sional measures of equality of opportunity to determine the fair distribution of
aid in this case.
In case of chapter five, a first natural extension would be to develop rankings
that allow for different property rights over the river in question. Technically,
that could be achieved by relaxing the anonymity assumption in the chapter.
As for applications, our rankings are easily applicable provided that one has
information over countries’ preferences over water consumption.
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